Stochastic Bankruptcy Games
We study bankruptcy games where the estate and the claims have stochastic values. We use the Weak Sequential Core as the solution concept for such games.We test the stability of a number of well known division rules in this stochastic setting and find that most of them are unstable, except for the Constrained Equal Awards rule, which is the only one belonging to the Weak Sequential Core.
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