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The strong sequential core for two-period economies

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  • Predtetchinski, Arkadi
  • Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
  • Peters, Hans

Abstract

The strong sequential core for two-stage economies with a possibly incomplete set of assets in period zero and trade in commodities in period one consists of those goods allocatioans that are in the classical core and moreover, after realization of the state of nature, in the endowments. The strong sequential core coincides with the classical core when all possible state-contigent contracts may serve as an asset. For finance economies it is shown that the strong sequential core is generically empty when there is an incomplete set of assets. Outside the setting of finance economies, we show that the strong sequential core can be empty even if there is an complete set of assets. If the set of constrained feasible allocations resulting from trading in assets, is enlarged to include also allocations outside the agents'comsumption sets, then a complete set of assets is sufficient for the equivalence of the resulting semi-strong sequential core and the classical core.
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  • Predtetchinski, Arkadi & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Peters, Hans, 2002. "The strong sequential core for two-period economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 465-482, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:38:y:2002:i:4:p:465-482
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    Cited by:

    1. Jean-François Caulier & Michel Grabisch & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2015. "An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 60(2), pages 283-313, October.
    2. Imma Curiel, 2015. "Compensation rules for multi-stage sequencing games," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 225(1), pages 65-82, February.
    3. Marc Germain & Philippe Toint & Henry Tulkens & Aart Zeeuw, 2006. "Transfers to Sustain Dynamic Core-Theoretic Cooperation in International Stock Pollutant Control," Springer Books, in: Parkash Chander & Jacques Drèze & C. Knox Lovell & Jack Mintz (ed.), Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition, chapter 0, pages 251-274, Springer.
    4. Kadam, Sangram V. & Kotowski, Maciej H., 2018. "Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 1-20.
    5. Habis, Helga & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques, 2011. "Transferable utility games with uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 2126-2139, September.
    6. P. Herings & A. Predtetchinski & A. Perea, 2006. "The Weak Sequential Core for Two-Period Economies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(1), pages 55-65, April.
    7. Helga Habis & P. Herings, 2013. "Stochastic bankruptcy games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(4), pages 973-988, November.
    8. Habis, Helga, 2012. "Sztochasztikus csődjátékok - avagy hogyan osszunk szét egy bizonytalan méretű tortát? [Stochastic bankruptcy games. How can a cake of uncertain dimensions be divided?]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(12), pages 1299-1310.
    9. Helga Habis & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 2010. "A Note On The Weak Sequential Core Of Dynamic Tu Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 12(04), pages 407-416.
    10. Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2007. "The strong sequential core for stationary cooperative games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 50-66, October.
    11. Konstantin Avrachenkov & Laura Cottatellucci & Lorenzo Maggi, 2014. "Confidence Intervals for the Shapley–Shubik Power Index in Markovian Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 10-31, March.
    12. Habis, Helga & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques, 2011. "Core concepts for incomplete market economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(4-5), pages 595-609.
    13. D. Bauso & J. Timmer, 2009. "Robust dynamic cooperative games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(1), pages 23-36, March.
    14. Habis, H. & Herings, P.J.J., 2009. "Cooperation under incomplete contracting," Research Memorandum 026, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    15. Berden, C., 2007. "The role of individual intertemporal transfers in dynamic TU-Games," Research Memorandum 030, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    16. Hellman, Ziv, 2008. "Bargaining Set Solution Concepts in Dynamic Cooperative Games," MPRA Paper 8798, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Helga Habis & Dávid Csercsik, 2015. "Cooperation with Externalities and Uncertainty," Networks and Spatial Economics, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 1-16, March.
    18. Josep Maria Izquierdo Aznar & Francesc Llerena & Carlos Rafels Pallarola, 2004. "Sequential decisions in allocation problems," Working Papers in Economics 116, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
    19. Laszlo A. Koczy, 2019. "The risk-based core for cooperative games with uncertainty," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1906, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    20. Engwerda, J.C., 2012. "Prospects of Tools from Differential Games in the Study Of Macroeconomics of Climate Change," Discussion Paper 2012-045, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    21. Ehud Lehrer & Marco Scarsini, 2013. "On the Core of Dynamic Cooperative Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 359-373, September.
    22. Parkash Chander & Myrna Wooders, 2016. "The Subgame Perfect Core," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 16-00006, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    23. Bhowmik Anuj & Gabriella Graziano Maria, 2020. "Blocking Coalitions and Fairness in Asset Markets and Asymmetric Information Economies," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(1), pages 1-29, January.
    24. Ziv Hellman, 2009. "Bargaining Set Solution Concepts in Repeated Cooperative Games," Discussion Paper Series dp523, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
    • D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
    • D3 - Microeconomics - - Distribution
    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design

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