IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/joecth/v73y2022i2d10.1007_s00199-020-01302-z.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Coalitions with limited coordination

Author

Listed:
  • Leonidas C. Koutsougeras

    (University of Manchester)

Abstract

We study economies endowed with a market structure, where coalitions can form within each market but have no enforcement possibilities across markets. A standard cooperative game cannot be defined in this case. We develop a certain equilibrium notion which ties together the cores of the different markets. We provide an existence result and an application to economies with asymmetric information.

Suggested Citation

  • Leonidas C. Koutsougeras, 2022. "Coalitions with limited coordination," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 73(2), pages 439-456, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:73:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s00199-020-01302-z
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01302-z
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00199-020-01302-z
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s00199-020-01302-z?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Cheng-Zhong Qin & Xintong Yang, 2020. "On the equivalence of rational expectations equilibrium with perfect Bayesian equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 69(4), pages 1127-1146, June.
    2. Leonidas C. Koutsougeras, 1998. "A two-stage core with applications to asset market and differential information economies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(3), pages 563-584.
    3. Zhao, Jingang, 1992. "The hybrid solutions of an N-person game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 145-160, January.
    4. Milgrom, Paul & Stokey, Nancy, 1982. "Information, trade and common knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 17-27, February.
    5. Vind, Karl, 1995. "Perfect competition or the core," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(9), pages 1733-1745, December.
    6. Arkadi Predtetchinski & P. Herings & Hans Peters, 2004. "The strong sequential core in a dynamic exchange economy," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 24(1), pages 147-162, July.
    7. Leonidas C. Koutsougeras & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2017. "A Note on Information, Trade and Common Knowledge," Studies in Economic Theory, in: Kazuo Nishimura & Alain Venditti & Nicholas C. Yannelis (ed.), Sunspots and Non-Linear Dynamics, chapter 0, pages 403-409, Springer.
    8. KOUTSOUGERAS, Leonidas C., 1999. "On an Edgeworth characterization of rational expectations equilibria in atomless asset market economies," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1430, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    9. KOUTSOUGERAS, Leonidas C., 1998. "A two-stage core with applications to asset market and differential information economies," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1428, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    10. Gerard Debreu, 1963. "On a Theorem of Scarf," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 30(3), pages 177-180.
    11. Gale, Douglas, 1978. "The core of a monetary economy without trust," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 456-491, December.
    12. Yeneng Sun & Lei Wu & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2013. "Incentive compatibility of rational expectations equilibrium in large economies: a counterexample," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 1(1), pages 3-10, May.
    13. Rafael Repullo, 1988. "The Core of an Economy with Transaction Costs," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 55(3), pages 447-458.
    14. Koutsougeras, Leonidas C & Yannelis, Nicholas C, 1993. "Incentive Compatibility and Information Superiority of the Core of an Economy with Differential Information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(2), pages 195-216, April.
    15. Vind, Karl, 1983. "Equilibrium with coordination," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 275-285, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Rabah Amir & Bernard Cornet & M. Ali Khan & David Levine & Edward C. Prescott, 2022. "Special Issue in honor of Nicholas C. Yannelis – Part II," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 73(2), pages 377-385, April.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2007. "The strong sequential core for stationary cooperative games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 50-66, October.
    2. Predtetchinski, Arkadi & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Peters, Hans, 2002. "The strong sequential core for two-period economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 465-482, December.
    3. Ulrich Schwalbe, 1999. "The core of an exchange economy with asymmetric information," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 70(2), pages 155-185, June.
    4. Bhowmik Anuj & Gabriella Graziano Maria, 2020. "Blocking Coalitions and Fairness in Asset Markets and Asymmetric Information Economies," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(1), pages 1-29, January.
    5. Habis, Helga & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques, 2011. "Core concepts for incomplete market economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(4-5), pages 595-609.
    6. Ehud Lehrer & Marco Scarsini, 2013. "On the Core of Dynamic Cooperative Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 359-373, September.
    7. Wei He & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2013. "A New Perspective on Rational Expectations," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1317, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    8. He, Wei & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2015. "Equilibrium theory under ambiguity," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 86-95.
    9. Habis, Helga, 2012. "Sztochasztikus csődjátékok - avagy hogyan osszunk szét egy bizonytalan méretű tortát? [Stochastic bankruptcy games. How can a cake of uncertain dimensions be divided?]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(12), pages 1299-1310.
    10. Habis, H. & Herings, P.J.J., 2009. "Cooperation under incomplete contracting," Research Memorandum 026, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    11. Predtetchinski, Arkadi & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Peters, Hans, 2002. "The strong sequential core for two-period economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 465-482, December.
    12. Krasa, Stefan, 1999. "Unimprovable Allocations in Economies with Incomplete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 144-168, July.
    13. Gonzalez, Stéphane & Rostom, Fatma Zahra, 2022. "Sharing the global outcomes of finite natural resource exploitation: A dynamic coalitional stability perspective," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 1-10.
    14. Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico & Vohra, Rajiv, 2002. "Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 1-41, September.
    15. Einy, Ezra & Moreno, Diego & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 2000. "Rational expectations equilibria and the ex-post core of an economy with asymmetric information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 527-535, December.
    16. Huang, Xuesong, 2021. "Incentive compatible self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 100-135.
    17. Athreya, Kartik B., 2014. "Big Ideas in Macroeconomics: A Nontechnical View," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262019736, December.
    18. Vind, Karl, 1995. "Perfect competition or the core," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(9), pages 1733-1745, December.
    19. Sun, Xiang & Sun, Yeneng & Wu, Lei & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2017. "Equilibria and incentives in private information economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 474-488.
    20. Laszlo A. Koczy, 2019. "The risk-based core for cooperative games with uncertainty," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1906, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Core; Multiple proposals; Incomplete coordination;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:73:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s00199-020-01302-z. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.