IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/gamebe/v4y1992i1p145-160.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The hybrid solutions of an N-person game

Author

Listed:
  • Zhao, Jingang

Abstract

We introduce a solution concept intermediate between the cooperative and noncooperative solutions of an n-person game in normal form. Consider a partition p of the players, with each s in p a coalition. A joint strategy x = {x_{s}|s in p} is a hybrid solution for the partition p if, for each s in p, x_{s} is a core solution of the corresponding parametric subgame, where this game is played by the players in s and is parameterized by x_{-s}, the strategies played by all outside players. This assumes that players behave cooperatively within each coalition and competitively across coalitions. Sufficient conditions are given for a general n-person game to have hybrid solutions for any partition.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Zhao, Jingang, 1992. "The hybrid solutions of an N-person game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 145-160, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:4:y:1992:i:1:p:145-160
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0899-8256(92)90010-P
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ichiishi, Tatsuro, 1981. "A Social Coalitional Equilibrium Existence Lemma," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(2), pages 369-377, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ichiishi, Tatsuro, 1985. "Management versus ownership, II," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 115-138, March.
    2. Bonnisseau, Jean-Marc & Iehle, Vincent, 2007. "Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 1-26, October.
    3. repec:dau:papers:123456789/89 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Yang, Zhe & Zhang, Xian, 2021. "A weak α-core existence theorem of games with nonordered preferences and a continuum of agents," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    5. Yang, Zhe & Yuan, George Xianzhi, 2019. "Some generalizations of Zhao’s theorem: Hybrid solutions and weak hybrid solutions for games with nonordered preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 94-100.
    6. Michael Finus & Bianca Rundshagen, 2009. "Membership rules and stability of coalition structures in positive externality games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 32(3), pages 389-406, March.
    7. Scalzo, Vincenzo, 2020. "Doubly Strong Equilibrium," MPRA Paper 99329, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Wooders, Myrna, 2008. "Small group effectiveness, per capita boundedness and nonemptiness of approximate cores," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(7-8), pages 888-906, July.
    9. László Á. Kóczy, 2002. "The Core in a Normal Form Game," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 28(9), pages 1.
    10. Brangewitz, Sonja & Brockhoff, Sarah, 2017. "Sustainability of coalitional equilibria within repeated tax competition," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 1-23.
    11. Kai Lessmann & Robert Marschinski & Michael Finus & Ulrike Kornek & Ottmar Edenhofer, 2014. "Emissions Trading with Non-signatories in a Climate Agreement—an Analysis of Coalition Stability," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 82, pages 82-109, December.
    12. Crettez, Bertrand & Nessah, Rabia & Tazdaït, Tarik, 2022. "On the strong hybrid solution of an n-person game," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 61-68.
    13. Hideo Konishi, 2010. "Efficient Mixed Clubs: Nonlinear‐Pricing Equilibria With Entrepreneurial Managers," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 61(1), pages 35-63, March.
    14. Bergin, James & Duggan, John, 1999. "An Implementation-Theoretic Approach to Non-cooperative Foundations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 50-76, May.
    15. Yang, Zhe, 2017. "Some infinite-player generalizations of Scarf’s theorem: Finite-coalition α-cores and weak α-cores," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 81-85.
    16. Michael Finus & Bianca Rundshagen & Johan Eyckmans, 2014. "Simulating a sequential coalition formation process for the climate change problem: first come, but second served?," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 220(1), pages 5-23, September.
    17. Rabia Nessah & Raluca Parvulescu, 2017. "On the Existence of Pareto Efficient Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 19(03), pages 1-13, September.
    18. Christian Pietro & Maria Gabriella Graziano & Vincenzo Platino, 2022. "Social loss with respect to the core of an economy with externalities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 73(2), pages 487-508, April.
    19. Jean-Marc Bonnisseau & Vincent Iehlé, 2007. "Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores (revised version)," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 678.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    20. Lan Di & George X. Yuan & Tu Zeng, 2021. "The consensus equilibria of mining gap games related to the stability of Blockchain Ecosystems," The European Journal of Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(4-5), pages 419-440, March.
    21. Subhadip Chakrabarti & Robert P. Gilles & Emiliya Lazarova, 2018. "Partial cooperation in strategic multi-sided decision situations," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 85(3), pages 455-478, October.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C22 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Time-Series Models; Dynamic Quantile Regressions; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models; Diffusion Processes

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:4:y:1992:i:1:p:145-160. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.