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Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores

Listed author(s):
  • Jean-Marc Bonnisseau

    ()

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Axe Economie mathématique et jeux - CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - PSE - Paris School of Economics)

  • Vincent Iehlé

    (CODE - UAB - Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona [Barcelona])

We prove the non-emptiness of the core of an NTU game satisfying a condition of payoff-dependent balancedness, based on transfer rate mappings.We also define a new equilibrium condition on transfer rates and we prove the existence of core payoff vectors satisfying this condition. The additional requirement of transfer rate equilibrium refines the core concept and allows the selection of specific core payoff vectors. Lastly, the class of parameterized cooperative games is introduced. This new setting and its associated equilibrium-core solution extend the usual cooperative game framework and core solution to situations depending on an exogenous environment. A non-emptiness result for the equilibrium-core is also provided in the context of a parameterized cooperative game. Our proofs borrow mathematical tools and geometric constructions from general equilibrium theory with non-convexities. Applications to extant results taken from game theory and economic theory are given.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) with number hal-00176203.

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Length:
Date of creation: 02 Oct 2007
Publication status: Published in Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, 2007, 61 (1), pp.1-26. 〈10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.002〉
Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00176203
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.002
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00176203
Contact details of provider: Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/

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