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Transfer rate rules and core selections in NTU games

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Abstract

Different kinds of asymmetries between players can occur in core allocations; in that case the stability of the concept is questioned. One remedy consists in selecting robust core allocations. We review, in this note, results that all select core allocations in NTU games with different concepts of robustness. Within a unified approach, we deduce the existence of allocations in : the partnered core, the social stable core, the core intersected with average prekernel, the weak inner core. We use a recent contribution of Bonnisseau and Iehlé (2003) that states the existence of core allocations with a transfer rate rule equilibrium under a dependent balancedness assumption. It shall turn out to be manipulable tools for selecting the core.

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  • Vincent Iehlé, 2004. "Transfer rate rules and core selections in NTU games," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques b04093, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
  • Handle: RePEc:mse:wpsorb:b04093
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    1. Herings, P.J.J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A.J.J., 2003. "Socially Structured Games and their Applications," Discussion Paper 2003-40, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    2. Qin Cheng-Zhong, 1993. "The Inner Core and the Strictly Inhibitive Set," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 96-106, February.
    3. Bonnisseau, Jean-Marc & Iehle, Vincent, 2007. "Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 1-26, October.
    4. Serrano, Roberto & Shimomura, Ken-Ichi, 2006. "A comparison of the average prekernel and the prekernel," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 288-301, December.
    5. Predtetchinski, Arkadi & Jean-Jacques Herings, P., 2004. "A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 116(1), pages 84-92, May.
    6. Reny, Philip J. & Holtz Wooders, Myrna, 1996. "The Partnered Core of a Game without Side Payments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 298-311, August.
    7. Bennett, Elaine, 1997. "Multilateral Bargaining Problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 151-179, May.
    8. Bennett, Elaine & Zame, William R, 1988. "Bargaining in Cooperative Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 17(4), pages 279-300.
    9. Orshan, Gooni & Zarzuelo, Jose M., 2000. "The Bilateral Consistent Prekernel for NTU Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 67-84, July.
    10. Qin Cheng-Zhong, 1994. "The Inner Core of an n-Person Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 431-444, May.
    11. Matthew O. Jackson, 2003. "A survey of models of network formation: Stability and efficiency," Working Papers 1161, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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    1. repec:dau:papers:123456789/89 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Sonja Brangewitz & Jan-Philip Gamp, 2014. "Competitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 57(3), pages 529-554, November.
    3. Bonnisseau, Jean-Marc & Iehle, Vincent, 2007. "Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 1-26, October.
    4. Jean-Marc Bonnisseau & Vincent Iehlé, 2007. "Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores (revised version)," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 678.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cooperative games; dependent balancedness; core selections in NTU games.;

    JEL classification:

    • C60 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - General
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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