Two remarks on the inner core
For the case of smooth concave exchange economies, we provide a characterization of the inner core as the set of feasible allocations such that no coalition can improve on it, even if coalitions are allowed to use some random plans. For the case of compactly generated games, we discuss Myerson's definition of the inner core, and we characterize it using lexicographic utility weight systems.
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- Qin, Cheng-Zhong, 1994. "An Inner Core Equivalence Theorem," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 4(2), pages 311-17, March.
- Qin Cheng-Zhong, 1993. "The Inner Core and the Strictly Inhibitive Set," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 96-106, February.
- Qin Cheng-Zhong, 1994. "The Inner Core of an n-Person Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 431-444, May.
- Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680, December.
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