The core-partition of hedonic games
A pure hedonic game describes the situation where player's utility depends only on the identity of the members of the group he belongs to. The paper provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of core-partition in hedonic games. The condition is based on a new concept of balancedness, called pivotal balancedness. pivotal balancedness involves especially the notion pivotal distribution that associates to each coalition a sub-group of players in the coalition. Then, we proceed to a review of several sufficient conditions for core-partition existence showing how the results can be unified through suitably chosen pivotal distributions.
|Date of creation:||Dec 2005|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 106 - 112 boulevard de l'Hôpital, 75647 Paris cedex 13|
Phone: 01 44 07 81 00
Fax: 01 44 07 81 09
Web page: http://mse.univ-paris1.fr/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- BOGOMOLNAIA, Anna & LE BRETON, Michel & SAVVATEEV, Alexei & WEBER, Shlomo, 2005.
"Stability of jurisdiction structures under the equal share and median rules,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2005032, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Anna Bogomolnaia & Michel Breton & Alexei Savvateev & Shlomo Weber, 2008. "Stability of jurisdiction structures under the equal share and median rules," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 34(3), pages 525-543, March.
- Bogomolnaia, Anna & Le Breton, Michel & Savvateev, Alexei & Weber, Shlomo, 2005. "Stability of Jurisdiction Structures under the Equal Share and Median Rule," IDEI Working Papers 362, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Herings P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski Arkadi, 2002.
"A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Non--emptiness of the Core of a Non--transferable Utility Game,"
016, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Predtetchinski, Arkadi & Jean-Jacques Herings, P., 2004. "A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 116(1), pages 84-92, May.
- Dinko Dimitrov & Peter Borm & Ruud Hendrickx & Shao Chin Sung, 2004.
"Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games,"
2004.51, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Dinko Dimitrov & Peter Borm & Ruud Hendrickx & Shao Sung, 2006. "Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(2), pages 421-433, April.
- Dimitrov, D.A. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hendrickx, R.L.P. & Sung, S.C., 2006. "Simple priorities and core stability in hedonic games," Other publications TiSEM 7c737a30-ac86-46ed-b210-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Dimitrov, D.A. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hendrickx, R.L.P. & Sung, S.C., 2004. "Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games," Discussion Paper 2004-5, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Dinko Dimitrov & Peter Borm, 2004. "Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 135, Econometric Society.
- Herbert E. Scarf, 1965. "The Core of an N Person Game," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 182R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Mamoru Kaneko & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1982.
"Cores of Partitioning Games,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
620, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Tayfun Sönmez & Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi, 2001.
"Core in a simple coalition formation game,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(1), pages 135-153.
- Szilvia Papai, 2000.
"Unique Stability in Simple Coalition Formation Games,"
Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers
1537, Econometric Society.
- Papai, Szilvia, 2004. "Unique stability in simple coalition formation games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 337-354, August.
- Burani, Nadia & Zwicker, William S., 2003. "Coalition formation games with separable preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 27-52, February.
- Dreze, J.H. & Greenberg, J., .
"Hedonic coalitions: optimality and stability,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
403, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Greenberg, Joseph & Weber, Shlomo, 1986. "Strong tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 101-117, February.
- Jean-Marc Bonnisseau & Vincent Iehle, 2004.
"Payoffs-dependent Balancedness and Cores,"
Game Theory and Information
- Jean-Marc Bonnisseau & Vincent Iehlé, 2007. "Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00176203, HAL.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mse:wpsorb:b05091. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lucie Label)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.