IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Coalition Formation in General Apex Games

  • Dominik Karos

We generalize the class of apex game by combining a winning coalition of symmetric minor players with�a collection of apex sets which can form winning coalitions only together with a fixed quota of minor players.� By applying power indices to these games and their subgames we generate players' preferences over coalitions which we use to define a coalition formation game.� We focus on strongly monotonic power indices and investigate under which conditions on the initial general apex game there are core stable coalitions in the resulting coalition formation game.� Besides several general results, we develop condition for the Shapley-Shubik index, the Banzhaf index, and the normalized Banzhaf index in particular.� It turns out that many statements can be easily verified for arbitrary collections of apex sets.� Nevertheless, we give some relations between the collection of apex sets and the set of core stable coalitions.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 680.

in new window

Date of creation: 28 Oct 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:680
Contact details of provider: Postal: Manor Rd. Building, Oxford, OX1 3UQ
Web page:

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Dimitrov, Dinko & Haake, Claus-Jochen, 2008. "Stable governments and the semistrict core," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 460-475, March.
  2. Tayfun Sönmez & Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi, 2001. "Core in a simple coalition formation game," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 135-153.
  3. Dinko Dimitrov & Claus-Jochen Haake, 2006. "A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 386, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
  4. Dreze, J H & Greenberg, J, 1980. "Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 987-1003, May.
  5. Montero, Maria, 2002. "Non-cooperative bargaining in apex games and the kernel," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 309-321, November.
  6. Vincent Iehlé, 2005. "The core-partition of hedonic games," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques b05091, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
  7. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002. "The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 201-230, February.
  8. Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-64, July.
  9. Dinko Dimitrov & Claus-Jochen Haake, 2005. "Government versus opposition: Who should be who in the 16th German Bundestag?," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 375, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
  10. Sagonti, Emanuela, 1991. "On the Strong Monotonicity of Power Indices," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 13-22.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:680. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Monica Birds)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.