Government versus opposition: Who should be who in the 16th German Bundestag?
We model the process of coalition formation in the 16th German Bundestag as a hedonic coalition formation game. In order to induce players' preferences in the game we apply the Shapley value of the simple game describing all winning coalitions in the Bundestag. Using different stability notions for hedonic games we prove that the "most" stable government is formed by the Union Parties together with the Social Democratic Party.
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- Shao Chin Sung & Dinko Dimitrov, 2005.
"A taxonomy of myopic stability concepts for hedonic games,"
Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers
373, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
- Dinko Dimitrov & Shao Chin Sung, 2006. "A Taxonomy of Myopic Stability Concepts for Hedonic Games," Working Papers 2006.10, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
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Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 153(2), pages 293-, June.
- Georg KIRCHSTEIGER & Clemens PUPPE, 1995. "On the Formation of Political Coalitions," Vienna Economics Papers vie9505, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Georg Kirchsteiger & Clemens Puppe, 1997. "On the formation of political coalitions," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/5915, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Bogomolnaia, Anna & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002. "The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 201-230, February.
- Tayfun Sönmez & Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi, 2001.
"Core in a simple coalition formation game,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 135-153.
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