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My bibliography Save this paperBargaining and Power
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Cited by:
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- Dominik Karos, 2016. "Stable partitions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(4), pages 817-838, November.
- Dominik Karos, 2016. "A note on monotonic power indices, smaller coalitions, and new members," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(1), pages 89-100, June.
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More about this item
Keywords
Coalition Formation; Power; Bargaining;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2013-07-28 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2013-07-28 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2013-07-28 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-NET-2013-07-28 (Network Economics)
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