On the Formation of Political Coalitions
The paper analyses the process of coalition formation among political parties using game-theoretic concepts. Two different motives determining that process are distinguished: the parties' preferences over alternative policies and the politicians' desire to get into office. Based on these motives, two alternaives models of coalition formation are suggested. It is shown that in situations involving only a few political parties - such as, e.g., in Germany or Austria - office-seeking considerations may generate stable coalition structures. On the other hand, if the number of parties becomes too large, stable solutions exist only under rather restrictive additional conditions. Several examples are provided illustrating the theoretical implications of the analysis.
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Volume (Year): 153 (1997)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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