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Paths to stability for overlapping group structures

Author

Listed:
  • Ana Mauleon
  • Nils Roehl
  • Vincent Vannetelbosch

Abstract

We study the stability of overlapping group structures where each group possesses a constitution that contains the rules governing both the composition of the group and the conditions needed to leave the group and/or to become a new member of the group. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition on preferences that guarantees the existence and the emergence of constitutionally stable group structures. We show that although more blocking power for the individuals might enlarge the set of constitutionally stable group structures, it could happen that the society will never reach a stable group structure.
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Suggested Citation

  • Ana Mauleon & Nils Roehl & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2019. "Paths to stability for overlapping group structures," LIDAM Reprints CORE 3001, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:3001
    Note: In : Journal of Mathematical Economics, 83, 19-24, 2019
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    Cited by:

    1. Chenghong Luo & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2021. "Network formation with myopic and farsighted players," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(4), pages 1283-1317, June.

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