The core of a monetary economy without trust
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Andolfatto, David & Martin, Fernando M. & Zhang, Shengxing, 2017. "Rehypothecation and liquidity," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 488-505.
- Predtetchinski, Arkadi & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Peters, Hans, 2002.
"The strong sequential core for two-period economies,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 465-482, December.
- P.J.J. Herings & H. Peeters, 2001. "The Strong Sequential Core for Two-period Economies," Microeconomics 0111002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Predtetchinski,Arkadi & Herings,Jean-Jacques, 2001. "The Strong Sequential Core for Two-period Economies," Research Memorandum 005, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Jérôme Creel & Henri Sterdyniak, 1999. "La politique monétaire sans monnaie," Revue de l'OFCE, Programme National Persée, vol. 70(1), pages 111-153.
- P. Herings & A. Predtetchinski & A. Perea, 2006. "The Weak Sequential Core for Two-Period Economies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(1), pages 55-65, April.
- Jose Noguera S., 2001.
"The Appearance of Carriers and the Origins of Money,"
0012014, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Jose Noguera, 2001. "The Appearance of Carriers and the Origins of Money," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp169, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
- Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2007. "The strong sequential core for stationary cooperative games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 50-66, October.
- Bossone, Biagio, 1999. "The role of trust in financial sector development," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2200, The World Bank.
- Marakulin, V., 2011. "Contracts and Domination in Competitive Economies," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, issue 9, pages 10-32.
- Habis, Helga & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques, 2011. "Core concepts for incomplete market economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(4-5), pages 595-609.
- Habis Helga & Herings P. Jean-Jacques, 2009. "Cooperation Under Incomplete Contracting," Research Memorandum 026, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Fisher, Eric ON., 1997. "A Note on the Core of a Monetary Economy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 425-434, June.
- Hellman, Ziv, 2008. "Bargaining Set Solution Concepts in Dynamic Cooperative Games," MPRA Paper 8798, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Josep Maria Izquierdo Aznar & Francesc Llerena & Carlos Rafels Pallarola, 2004. "Sequential decisions in allocation problems," Working Papers in Economics 116, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
- Routledge, R.R., 2014. "Deviations, uncertainty and the core," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 286-297.
- repec:eee:gamebe:v:112:y:2018:i:c:p:1-20 is not listed on IDEAS
- Parkash Chander & Myrna Wooders, 2010. "Subgame Perfect Cooperation in an Extensive Game," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 1008, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Ulrich Schwalbe, 1999. "The core of an exchange economy with asymmetric information," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 70(2), pages 155-185, June.
- Kotowski, Maciej, 2019. "A Perfectly Robust Approach to Multiperiod Matching Problems," Working Paper Series rwp19-016, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Ehud Lehrer & Marco Scarsini, 2013. "On the Core of Dynamic Cooperative Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 359-373, September.
- Parkash Chander & Myrna Wooders, 2016. "The Subgame Perfect Core," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 16-00006, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/2961 is not listed on IDEAS
- Anuj Bhowmik & Maria Gabriella Graziano, 2018. "Blocking Coalitions and Fairness in Asset Markets and Asymmetric Information Economies," CSEF Working Papers 510, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- Ziv Hellman, 2009. "Bargaining Set Solution Concepts in Repeated Cooperative Games," Discussion Paper Series dp523, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Peter N. Ireland, 1994. "Money and the gain from enduring relationships in the turnpike model," Working Paper 94-07, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, revised 1994.
More about this item
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:19:y:1978:i:2:p:456-491. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869 .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.