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Feudal political economy

Author

Listed:
  • Desiree A. Desierto

    (George Mason University)

  • Mark Koyama

    (George Mason University)

Abstract

How is order achieved in a realm in which every elite commands both economic and military resources, and no stable institutions of power exist? We depict coalition formation in the feudal world as a series of non-binding agreements between elites who can move in and out of the coalition, through peaceful and violent means. We derive conditions under which the realm unites under one rule — a grand coalition, or remains fragmented. We motivate our analysis with key historical episodes in medieval Europe, from the Frankish Kingdom in the 5th to 10th centuries and England in the 11th to 15th centuries.

Suggested Citation

  • Desiree A. Desierto & Mark Koyama, 2025. "Feudal political economy," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 80(2), pages 619-658, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:80:y:2025:i:2:d:10.1007_s00199-024-01583-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01583-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Leon, Gabriel, 2020. "Feudalism, Collaboration and Path Dependence in England’s Political Development," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(2), pages 511-533, April.
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    1. Desierto, Desiree A. & Koyama, Mark, 2026. "Castles," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • N43 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: Pre-1913

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