IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wrk/warwec/1129.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Geography, Transparency and Institutions

Author

Listed:
  • Mayshar, Joram

    (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

  • Moav, Omer

    (University of Warwick.)

  • Neeman, Zvika

    (Tel-Aviv University)

Abstract

We propose a theory by which geographic attributes explain cross-regional institutional differences in : (1) the scale of the state, (2) the distribution of power within state hierarchy, and (3) property rights over land. The mechanism that underlies our theory concerns the states extractive capacity. In particular, we argue that the ability to appropriate revenue from the farming sector is affected by the transparency of farming which, in turn, is affected by geography and technology. We apply the theory to explain the differences between the institutions of Ancient Egypt, Southern Mesopotamia and Northern Mesopotamia

Suggested Citation

  • Mayshar, Joram & Moav, Omer & Neeman, Zvika, 2016. "Geography, Transparency and Institutions," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1129, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:1129
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2016/twerp_1129_moav.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Adolph Wagner, 1958. "Three Extracts on Public Finance," International Economic Association Series, in: Richard A. Musgrave & Alan T. Peacock (ed.), Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, pages 1-15, Palgrave Macmillan.
    2. Besley, Timothy & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2010. "Property Rights and Economic Development," Handbook of Development Economics, in: Dani Rodrik & Mark Rosenzweig (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 0, pages 4525-4595, Elsevier.
    3. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2009. "The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1218-1244, September.
    4. Jeanet Sinding Bentzen & Nicolai Kaarsen & Asger Moll Wingender, 2017. "Irrigation and Autocracy," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 15(1), pages 1-53.
    5. Joesph E. Stiglitz, 1975. "Incentives, Risk, and Information: Notes Towards a Theory of Hierarchy," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 6(2), pages 552-579, Autumn.
    6. Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Claus Thustrup Kreiner & Emmanuel Saez, 2016. "Why Can Modern Governments Tax So Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 83(330), pages 219-246, April.
    7. Louis Putterman & David N. Weil, 2010. "Post-1500 Population Flows and The Long-Run Determinants of Economic Growth and Inequality," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 125(4), pages 1627-1682.
    8. Alan T. Peacock & Jack Wiseman, 1961. "The Growth of Public Expenditure in the United Kingdom," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number peac61-1, March.
    9. Casey B. Mulligan & Ricard Gil & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 2004. "Do Democracies Have Different Public Policies than Nondemocracies?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(1), pages 51-74, Winter.
    10. Banerjee, Abhijit V. & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2004. "Eviction threats and investment incentives," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 469-488, August.
    11. Daniel A. Ackerberg & Maristella Botticini, 2002. "Endogenous Matching and the Empirical Determinants of Contract Form," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(3), pages 564-591, June.
    12. Ernesto Dal Bó & Pablo Hernández & Sebastián Mazzuca, 2015. "The Paradox of Civilization: Pre-Institutional Sources of Security and Prosperity," NBER Working Papers 21829, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Mayshary, Joram & Moav, Omer & Neeman, Zvika & Pascali, Luigi, 2015. "Cereals Appropriability and Hierarchy," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 238, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    14. Mayshar, Joram, 1991. " Taxation with Costly Administration," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 93(1), pages 75-88.
    15. Stasavage, David, 2010. "When Distance Mattered: Geographic Scale and the Development of European Representative Assemblies," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 104(4), pages 625-643, November.
    16. Joram Mayshar & Omer Moav & Zvika Neeman, 2011. "Transparency, Appropriability and the Early State," Working Papers 002-11, International School of Economics at TSU, Tbilisi, Republic of Georgia.
    17. Slemrod, Joel & Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 2002. "Tax avoidance, evasion, and administration," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 22, pages 1423-1470, Elsevier.
    18. Boix,Carles, 2015. "Political Order and Inequality," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107089433.
    19. Greif,Avner, 2006. "Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521671347, January.
    20. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-444, June.
    21. Luis Garicano, 2000. "Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(5), pages 874-904, October.
    22. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1974. "Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 41(2), pages 219-255.
    23. Sng, Tuan-Hwee, 2014. "Size and dynastic decline: The principal-agent problem in late imperial China, 1700–1850," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 107-127.
    24. Domar, Evsey D., 1970. "The Causes of Slavery or Serfdom: A Hypothesis," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 30(1), pages 18-32, March.
    25. Hicks, J. R., 1969. "A Theory of Economic History," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198811633, Decembrie.
    26. Greif, Avner, 1993. "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi Traders' Coalition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 525-548, June.
    27. Chwe, Michael Suk-Young, 1990. "Why Were Workers Whipped? Pain in a Principal-Agent Model," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(403), pages 1109-1121, December.
    28. Allen, Robert C., 1997. "Agriculture and the Origins of the State in Ancient Egypt," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 135-154, April.
    29. Bockstette, Valerie & Chanda, Areendam & Putterman, Louis, 2002. "States and Markets: The Advantage of an Early Start," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 7(4), pages 347-369, December.
    30. Nahum D. Melumad & Dilip Mookherjee & Stefan Reichelstein, 1995. "Hierarchical Decentralization of Incentive Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(4), pages 654-672, Winter.
    31. Ma, Debin, 2011. "Rock, scissors, paper: the problem of incentives and information in traditional Chinese state and the origin of Great Divergence," Economic History Working Papers 37569, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History.
    32. Ackerberg, Daniel A. & Botticini, Maristella, 2000. "The Choice of Agrarian Contracts in Early Renaissance Tuscany: Risk Sharing, Moral Hazard, or Capital Market Imperfections?," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 241-257, July.
    33. Boix,Carles, 2015. "Political Order and Inequality," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107461079.
    34. Bengt Holmström, 1999. "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 169-182.
    35. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1979. "Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 231-259, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Roland, Gerard, 2020. "The deep historical roots of modern culture: A comparative perspective," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 483-508.
    2. Jesús Fernández-Villaverde & Mark Koyama & Youhong Lin & Tuan-Hwee Sng, 2023. "The Fractured-Land Hypothesis," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 138(2), pages 1173-1231.
    3. Anderlini, L. & Felli, L. & Piccone, M., 2022. "The Emergence of Enforcement," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2250, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    4. Nils-Petter Lagerlöf, 2021. "Multiple steady statehood: the roles of productive and extractive capacities," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 113-152, June.
    5. Oded Galor & Ömer Özak, 2016. "The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(10), pages 3064-3103, October.
    6. Hoang-Anh Ho & Peter Martinsson & Ola Olsson, 2022. "The origins of cultural divergence: evidence from Vietnam," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 45-89, March.
    7. Jeffry Frieden & Arthur Silve, 2023. "The political reception of innovations," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(2), pages 595-628, July.
    8. Huning, Thilo R. & Wahl, Fabian, 2023. "You reap what you know: Appropriability and the origin of European states," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    9. Matranga, Andrea, 2017. "The Ant and the Grasshopper: Seasonality and the Invention of Agriculture," MPRA Paper 76626, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Ernesto Dal Bó & Pablo Hernández & Sebastián Mazzuca, 2015. "The Paradox of Civilization: Pre-Institutional Sources of Security and Prosperity," NBER Working Papers 21829, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Lagerlöf, Nils-Petter, 2016. "Statehood, democracy and preindustrial development," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 58-72.
    12. Hoang-Anh Ho, 2020. "Tying peasants to their land: The rise and fall of private property rights in historical Vietnam," eabh Papers 20-01, The European Association for Banking and Financial History (EABH).
    13. Benati, Giacomo & Guerriero, Carmine & Zaina, Federico, 2022. "The origins of political institutions and property rights," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 946-968.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Mayshar, Joram & Moav, Omer & Neeman, Zvika, 2011. "Transparency, Appropriability and the Early State," CEPR Discussion Papers 8548, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Johnson, Noel D. & Koyama, Mark, 2017. "States and economic growth: Capacity and constraints," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 1-20.
    3. Susan Athey & Emilio Calvano & Saumitra Jha, 2016. "A Theory of Community Formation and Social Hierarchy," CSEF Working Papers 451, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    4. Borcan, Oana & Olsson, Ola & Putterman, Louis, 2021. "Transition to agriculture and first state presence: A global analysis," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
    5. Depetris-Chauvin, Emilio & Özak, Ömer, 2015. "Population Diversity, Division of Labor and the Emergence of Trade and State," MPRA Paper 69565, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. James B. Ang, 2015. "What Drives the Historical Formation and Persistent Development of Territorial States?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 117(4), pages 1134-1175, October.
    7. Oana Borcan & Ola Olsson & Louis Putterman, 2018. "State history and economic development: evidence from six millennia," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 1-40, March.
    8. Ang, James B. & Madsen, Jakob B. & Wang, Wen, 2021. "Rice farming, culture and democracy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 136(C).
    9. James Fenske, 2014. "Ecology, Trade, And States In Pre-Colonial Africa," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 612-640, June.
    10. Aguirre, Alvaro, 2016. "The risk of civil conflicts as a determinant of political institutions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 36-59.
    11. Aguirre, Alvaro, 2019. "Rebellions, Technical Change, and the Early Development of Political Institutions in Latin America," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 65-89.
    12. Depetris-Chauvin, Emilio & Özak, Ömer, 2016. "Population Diversity, Division of Labor and Comparative Development," MPRA Paper 70503, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Jimenez-Ayora, Pablo & Ulubaşoğlu, Mehmet Ali, 2015. "What underlies weak states? The role of terrain ruggedness," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 167-183.
    14. Lagerlöf, Nils-Petter, 2016. "Statehood, democracy and preindustrial development," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 58-72.
    15. Vu, Trung V., 2021. "Statehood experience and income inequality: A historical perspective," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 415-429.
    16. James Fenske, 2014. "Ecology, Trade, And States In Pre-Colonial Africa," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 612-640, 06.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Geography ; Transparency ; Institutions ; Land Tenure ; State Capacity ; State Concentration;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:1129. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Margaret Nash (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/dewaruk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.