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Transparency, Appropriability and the Early State

Author

Listed:
  • Joram Mayshar

    (Department of Economics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

  • Omer Moav

    (Department of Economics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Royal Holloway University of London, and CEPR)

  • Zvika Neeman

    (Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Tel-Aviv University)

Abstract

We propose a general theory that explains the extent of the state and accounts for related institutions as byproducts of the state's extractive technology. We posit further that this extractive technology is determined by the transparency of the production technology. This theory is applied to examine two principal phases in the evolution of the early state. First, we argue that the common explanation of the emergence of the state as a consequence of the availability of food surplus due to the Neolithic Revolution is flawed, since it ignores Malthusian considerations. In contrast, we suggest that what led to the emergence of the state was a transformation of the tax technology that was induced by the greater transparency of the new farming technology. We then apply our theory to explain key institutional features that distinguished ancient Egypt from ancient Mesopotamia, and, in particular, to explain their different land tenure regimes.

Suggested Citation

  • Joram Mayshar & Omer Moav & Zvika Neeman, 2011. "Transparency, Appropriability and the Early State," Working Papers 002-11, International School of Economics at TSU, Tbilisi, Republic of Georgia.
  • Handle: RePEc:tbs:wpaper:11-002
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    Cited by:

    1. Ang, James B., 2020. "Early state institutions and the persistence of linguistic diversity," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    2. Mayshar, Joram & Moav, Omer & Neeman, Zvika, 2017. "Geography, Transparency, and Institutions," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 111(3), pages 622-636, August.
    3. James B. Ang, 2015. "What Drives the Historical Formation and Persistent Development of Territorial States?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 117(4), pages 1134-1175, October.
    4. Ra�l S�nchez de la Sierra, 2015. "On the Origins of States: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo," HiCN Working Papers 194, Households in Conflict Network.
    5. James Fenske, 2014. "Ecology, Trade, And States In Pre-Colonial Africa," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 612-640, June.
    6. James Fenske, 2014. "Ecology, Trade, And States In Pre-Colonial Africa," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 612-640, 06.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth

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