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Conflict initiation function shapes the evolution of persistent outcomes in group conflict

Author

Listed:
  • Bilancini, Ennio
  • Boncinelli, Leonardo
  • Marcos-Prieto, Pablo

Abstract

We take an evolutionary perspective to explore the implications of different relationships between power and initiation of conflicts (i.e., conflict initiation function) for the long-run distribution of power between groups. So far, attention has focused on how the role played by the relationship between power and success in conflicts (i.e., conflict success function) affects the long-run distribution of power. We find conditions under which hegemony is a long-run outcome, as well as analogous conditions for balance of power. Specifically, hegemony prevails when conflicts are more likely to be initiated by stronger groups against weaker groups, while balance of power prevails when the opposite holds. Interestingly, the conflict success function plays a minor role in our setting, where victory or defeat are always outcomes that occur with non-negligible probability.

Suggested Citation

  • Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo & Marcos-Prieto, Pablo, 2024. "Conflict initiation function shapes the evolution of persistent outcomes in group conflict," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 161(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:161:y:2024:i:c:s0014292123002763
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104648
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    Cited by:

    1. Levine, David K. & Modica, Salvatore, 2022. "Survival of the Weakest: Why the West Rules," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 204(C), pages 394-421.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Evolution; Balance of power; Hegemony; Group conflict; Error models;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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