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The Evolution of Resilience

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  • David K Levine

Abstract

I analyze a social evolutionary model in which there is a non-excludable public good that reduces the chances of catastrophe. I show that while resilient types that produce the public good cannot survive head-to-head competition with other more selfish types in a fixed population, they do if catastrophes reduce population.
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Suggested Citation

  • David K Levine, 2025. "The Evolution of Resilience," Levine's Working Paper Archive 735347000000000013, David K. Levine.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:735347000000000013
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    File URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4735347000000000013.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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