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Coalitions, tipping points and the speed of evolution

  • Newton, Jonathan
  • Angus, Simon D.

This study considers pure coordination games on networks and the waiting time for an adaptive process of strategic change to achieve efficient coordination. Although it is in the interest of every player to coordinate on a single globally efficient norm, coalitional behavior at a local level can greatly slow, as well as hasten convergence to efficiency. For some networks, when one action becomes efficient enough relative to the other, the effect of coalitional behavior changes abruptly from a conservative effect to a reforming effect. These effects are confirmed for a variety of stylized and empirical social networks found in the literature. For coordination games in which the Pareto efficient and risk dominant equilibria differ, polymorphic states can be the only stochastically stable states.

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Paper provided by University of Sydney, School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2013-02.

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Date of creation: Jan 2013
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Handle: RePEc:syd:wpaper:2123/8895
Contact details of provider: Postal: Sydney, NSW 2006
Phone: 61 +2 9351 5055
Fax: 61 +2 9351 4341
Web page: http://sydney.edu.au/arts/economics
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  1. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
  2. Jackson, Matthew O. & Watts, Alison, 2002. "The Evolution of Social and Economic Networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 265-295, October.
  3. Newton, Jonathan & Angus, Simon D., 2015. "Coalitions, tipping points and the speed of evolution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 172-187.
  4. Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Markus Walzl, 2008. "Stochastic Stability for Roommate Markets," Working Papers 357, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  5. Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 2003. "MISTAKE IN COOPERATION:the Stochastic Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting," Working Papers 2003-23, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  6. Newton, Jonathan & Sawa, Ryoji, 2013. "A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems," Working Papers 2013-09, University of Sydney, School of Economics, revised Jul 2014.
  7. Peski, Marcin, 2010. "Generalized risk-dominance and asymmetric dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 216-248, January.
  8. Marianna Belloc & Samuel Bowles, 2013. "The Persistence of Inferior Cultural-Institutional Conventions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(3), pages 93-98, May.
  9. M. Kandori & G. Mailath & R. Rob, 1999. "Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 500, David K. Levine.
  10. Kreindler, Gabriel E. & Young, H. Peyton, 2013. "Fast convergence in evolutionary equilibrium selection," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 39-67.
  11. Sung Ha Hwang, 2009. "Larger groups may alleviate collective action problems," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2009-05, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
  12. Newton, Jonathan, 2012. "Recontracting and stochastic stability in cooperative games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 364-381.
  13. Ellison, Glenn, 1993. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-71, September.
  14. Sawa, Ryoji, 2014. "Coalitional stochastic stability in games, networks and markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 90-111.
  15. Ellison, Glenn, 2000. "Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(1), pages 17-45, January.
  16. Newton, Jonathan, 2012. "Coalitional stochastic stability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 842-854.
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