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Shared intentions: the evolution of collaboration

Listed author(s):
  • Newton, Jonathan

The ability to share intentions and adjust one's choices in collaboration with others is a fundamental aspect of human nature. We discuss the forces that would have acted for and against the evolution of this ability for a large class of dilemmas and coordination problems that would have been faced by our hominin ancestors. In contrast to altruism and other non-fitness maximizing preferences, the ability to share intentions proliferates when rare without requiring repeated interaction or assortativity in matching.

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File URL: http://econ-wpseries.com/2015/201505-02.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Sydney, School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2015-05.

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Date of creation: Mar 2015
Handle: RePEc:syd:wpaper:2015-05
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Sydney, NSW 2006

Phone: 61 +2 9351 5055
Fax: 61 +2 9351 4341
Web page: http://sydney.edu.au/arts/economics
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  4. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
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  9. Sugden, Robert, 2000. "Team Preferences," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(02), pages 175-204, October.
  10. Robson, Arthur J., 1996. "The Evolution of Attitudes to Risk: Lottery Tickets and Relative Wealth," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 190-207, June.
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  12. Ambrus, Attila, 2009. "Theories of Coalitional Rationality," Scholarly Articles 3204917, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  13. Evans, Robert & Maskin, Eric, 1989. "Efficient renegotiation--proof equilibria in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 361-369, December.
  14. Ambrus, Attila, 2009. "Theories of coalitional rationality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 676-695, March.
  15. David P. Myatt & Chris Wallace, 2008. "When Does One Bad Apple Spoil the Barrel? An Evolutionary Analysis of Collective Action," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(2), pages 499-527.
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