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Shared intentions: the evolution of collaboration

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  • Newton, Jonathan

Abstract

The ability to share intentions and adjust one's choices in collaboration with others is a fundamental aspect of human nature. We discuss the forces that would have acted for and against the evolution of this ability for a large class of dilemmas and coordination problems that would have been faced by our hominin ancestors. In contrast to altruism and other non-fitness maximizing preferences, the ability to share intentions proliferates when rare without requiring repeated interaction or assortativity in matching.

Suggested Citation

  • Newton, Jonathan, 2015. "Shared intentions: the evolution of collaboration," Working Papers 2015-05, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:syd:wpaper:2015-05
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. repec:gam:jgames:v:8:y:2017:i:4:p:50-:d:119204 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Alger, Ingela & Lehmann, Laurent & Weibull, Jörgen W., 2018. "Evolution of preferences in group-structured populations: genes, guns, and culture," TSE Working Papers 18-888, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Sep 2018.
    3. Newton, Jonathan & Wait, Andrew & Angus, Simon D., 2016. "Watercooler chat, organizational structure and corporate culture," Working Papers 2016-03, University of Sydney, School of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Evolution; shared intentions; norm;

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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