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The Evolution of Collaboration in Symmetric 2x2-Games with Imperfect Recognition of Types

Author

Listed:
  • Hannes Rusch

    (Philipps-Universität Marburg)

Abstract

A recent series of papers has introduced a fresh perspective on the problem of the evolution of human cooperation by suggesting an amendment to the concept of cooperation itself: instead of thinking of cooperation as playing a particular strategy in a given game, usually C in the prisoner's dilemma, we could also think of cooperation as collaboration, i.e. as coalitional strategy choice, such as jointly switching from (D;D) to (C;C). The present paper complements previous work on collaboration by expanding on its genericity while relaxing the assumption that collaborators are able to perfectly identify their own kind. Conditions for the evolutionary viability of such collaboration under fairly undemanding assumptions about population and interaction structure are derived. Doing so, this paper shows that collaboration is an adaptive principle of strategy choice in a broad range of niches, i.e., stochastic mixtures of games.

Suggested Citation

  • Hannes Rusch, 2017. "The Evolution of Collaboration in Symmetric 2x2-Games with Imperfect Recognition of Types," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201739, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    • Handle: RePEc:mar:magkse:201739
    as

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    File URL: http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/magkspapers/paper_2017/39-2017_rusch.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sawa, Ryoji, 2014. "Coalitional stochastic stability in games, networks and markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 90-111.
    2. Newton, Jonathan, 2012. "Coalitional stochastic stability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 842-854.
    3. Bryan Randolph Bruns, 2015. "Names for Games: Locating 2 × 2 Games," Games, MDPI, vol. 6(4), pages 1-26, October.
    4. Hannelore De Silva & Christoph Hauert & Arne Traulsen & Karl Sigmund, 2010. "Freedom, enforcement, and the social dilemma of strong altruism," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 203-217, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    cooperation; collaboration; strategy choice; evolution;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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