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The preferences of Homo Moralis are unstable under evolving assortativity

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  • Jonathan Newton

    (University of Sydney)

Abstract

Differing degrees of assortativity in matching can be expected to have both genetic and cultural determinants. When assortativity is subject to evolution, the main result of Alger and Weibull (Econometrica 81:2269–2302 2013) on the evolution of stable other-regarding preferences does not hold. Instead, both non-Nash and Pareto inefficient behavior are evolutionarily unstable.

Suggested Citation

  • Jonathan Newton, 2017. "The preferences of Homo Moralis are unstable under evolving assortativity," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(2), pages 583-589, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:46:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s00182-016-0548-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-016-0548-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bomze Immanuel M. & Weibull Jorgen W., 1995. "Does Neutral Stability Imply Lyapunov Stability?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 173-192, November.
    2. U. Dieckmann & M. Doebeli, 1999. "On the Origin of Species by Sympatric Speciation," Working Papers ir99013, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
    3. Ingela Alger & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2013. "Homo Moralis—Preference Evolution Under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(6), pages 2269-2302, November.
    4. Ulf Dieckmann & Michael Doebeli, 1999. "On the origin of species by sympatric speciation," Nature, Nature, vol. 400(6742), pages 354-357, July.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Rusch, Hannes, 2019. "The evolution of collaboration in symmetric 2×2-games with imperfect recognition of types," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 118-127.
    2. Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli & Eugenio Vicario, 2022. "Assortativity in cognition," Working Papers - Economics wp2022_11.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
    3. Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli & Alessandro Tampieri, 2021. "Strategy Assortativity and the Evolution of Parochialism," DEM Discussion Paper Series 21-20, Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg.
    4. Martin Kaae Jensen & Alexandros Rigos, 2018. "Evolutionary games and matching rules," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(3), pages 707-735, September.
    5. Ziwei Wang & Jiabin Wu, 2023. "Partner Choice and Morality: Preference Evolution under Stable Matching," Papers 2304.11504, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2023.
    6. Alger, Ingela & Weibull, Jörgen W. & Lehmann, Laurent, 2020. "Evolution of preferences in structured populations: Genes, guns, and culture," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    7. Heinrich H. Nax & Ryan O. Murphy & Stefano Duca & Dirk Helbing, 2017. "Contribution-Based Grouping under Noise," Games, MDPI, vol. 8(4), pages 1-23, November.
    8. Nax, Heinrich H. & Rigos, Alexandros, 2015. "Assortativity evolving from social dilemmas," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 65447, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    9. Jiabin Wu, 2016. "Evolving assortativity and social conventions," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 36(2), pages 936-941.
    10. Jiabin Wu, 2021. "Matching markets and cultural selection," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 25(4), pages 267-288, December.
    11. Wu, Jiabin, 2023. "Institutions, assortative matching and cultural evolution," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    12. Xu, Hedong & Fan, Suohai & Tian, Cunzhi & Xiao, Xinrong, 2019. "Effect of strategy-assortativity on investor sharing games in the market," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 514(C), pages 211-225.
    13. Sethi, Rajiv, 2021. "Stable sampling in repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    14. Jonathan Newton, 2018. "Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(2), pages 1-67, May.
    15. Newton, Jonathan, 2017. "Shared intentions: The evolution of collaboration," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 517-534.
    16. Wu, Jiabin, 2018. "Entitlement to assort: Democracy, compromise culture and economic stability," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 146-148.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Evolution; Moral values; Assortative matching;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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