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Evolving assortativity and social conventions

Author

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  • Jiabin Wu

    (Department of Economics, University of Oregon)

Abstract

This paper considers a stochastic evolutionary model in which agents can vote for different policies through majority voting that induce different assortative matching patterns. We find that in coordination games, agents either vote for complete segregation policy or maximal integration policy. The Pareto-dominant social convention is always stochastically stable and it is possible that both risk-dominant and Pareto-dominant social conventions are stochastically stable. This contrasts to risk-dominant social convention being uniquely stochastically stable predicted in conventional stochastic stability analysis where matching is uniformly random.

Suggested Citation

  • Jiabin Wu, 2016. "Evolving assortativity and social conventions," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 36(2), pages 936-941.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-16-00350
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alexandros Rigos & Heinrich H. Nax, 2015. "Assortativity evolving from social dilemmas," Discussion Papers in Economics 15/19, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
    2. Jonathan Newton, 2017. "The preferences of Homo Moralis are unstable under evolving assortativity," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(2), pages 583-589, May.
    3. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, April.
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    5. Izquierdo, Luis R. & Izquierdo, Segismundo S. & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 2014. "Leave and let leave: A sufficient condition to explain the evolutionary emergence of cooperation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 91-113.
    6. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
    7. Theodore C. Bergstrom, 2003. "The Algebra of Assortative Encounters and the Evolution of Cooperation," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 5(03), pages 211-228.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jiabin Wu, 2021. "Matching markets and cultural selection," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 25(4), pages 267-288, December.
    2. Jiabin Wu, 2020. "Labelling, homophily and preference evolution," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(1), pages 1-22, March.
    3. Wu, Jiabin, 2023. "Institutions, assortative matching and cultural evolution," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    4. Jonathan Newton, 2018. "Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(2), pages 1-67, May.
    5. Wu, Jiabin, 2017. "Political institutions and the evolution of character traits," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 260-276.
    6. Ethan Holdahl & Jiabin Wu, 2023. "Institutional Screening and the Sustainability of Conditional Cooperation," Papers 2311.02813, arXiv.org.
    7. Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli & Alessandro Tampieri, 2021. "Strategy Assortativity and the Evolution of Parochialism," DEM Discussion Paper Series 21-20, Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg.
    8. Martin Kaae Jensen & Alexandros Rigos, 2018. "Evolutionary games and matching rules," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(3), pages 707-735, September.
    9. Ziwei Wang & Jiabin Wu, 2023. "Partner Choice and Morality: Preference Evolution under Stable Matching," Papers 2304.11504, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2023.
    10. Wu, Jiabin, 2018. "Entitlement to assort: Democracy, compromise culture and economic stability," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 146-148.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    assortative matching; social conventions; majority voting; risk-dominance; pareto-dominance; evolutionary game theory; stochastic stability; equilibrium selection;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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