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The preferences of Homo Moralis are unstable under evolving assortativity

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  • Newton, Jonathan

Abstract

Differing degrees of assortativity in matching can be expected to have both genetic and cultural determinants. When assortativity is subject to evolution, the main result of of Alger and Weibull (2013) on the evolution of stable other regarding preferences does not hold. Instead, both non-Nash and Pareto inefficient behavior are evolutionarily unstable.

Suggested Citation

  • Newton, Jonathan, 2014. "The preferences of Homo Moralis are unstable under evolving assortativity," Working Papers 2014-14, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:syd:wpaper:2014-14
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    Cited by:

    1. Ethan Holdahl & Jiabin Wu, 2023. "Conflicts, assortative matching, and the evolution of signaling norms," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 18(4), pages 735-757, October.
    2. Rusch, Hannes, 2019. "The evolution of collaboration in symmetric 2×2-games with imperfect recognition of types," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 118-127.
    3. Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli & Eugenio Vicario, 2022. "Assortativity in cognition," Working Papers - Economics wp2022_11.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
    4. Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo & Tampieri, Alessandro, 2024. "Strategy assortativity and the evolution of parochialism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 227(C).
    5. Martin Kaae Jensen & Alexandros Rigos, 2018. "Evolutionary games and matching rules," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(3), pages 707-735, September.
    6. Ziwei Wang & Jiabin Wu, 2023. "Preference Evolution under Partner Choice," Papers 2304.11504, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2025.
    7. Alger, Ingela & Weibull, Jörgen W. & Lehmann, Laurent, 2020. "Evolution of preferences in structured populations: Genes, guns, and culture," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    8. Heinrich H. Nax & Ryan O. Murphy & Stefano Duca & Dirk Helbing, 2017. "Contribution-Based Grouping under Noise," Games, MDPI, vol. 8(4), pages 1-23, November.
    9. Nax, Heinrich H. & Rigos, Alexandros, 2015. "Assortativity evolving from social dilemmas," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 65447, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    10. Jiabin Wu, 2016. "Evolving assortativity and social conventions," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 36(2), pages 936-941.
    11. Jiabin Wu, 2021. "Matching markets and cultural selection," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 25(4), pages 267-288, December.
    12. Wu, Jiabin, 2023. "Institutions, assortative matching and cultural evolution," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    13. Xu, Hedong & Fan, Suohai & Tian, Cunzhi & Xiao, Xinrong, 2019. "Effect of strategy-assortativity on investor sharing games in the market," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 514(C), pages 211-225.
    14. Sethi, Rajiv, 2021. "Stable sampling in repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    15. Jonathan Newton, 2018. "Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(2), pages 1-67, May.
    16. Wu, Jiabin, 2018. "Entitlement to assort: Democracy, compromise culture and economic stability," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 146-148.
    17. Newton, Jonathan, 2017. "Shared intentions: The evolution of collaboration," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 517-534.

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    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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