The preferences of Homo Moralis are unstable under evolving assortativity
Differing degrees of assortativity in matching can be expected to have both genetic and cultural determinants. When assortativity is subject to evolution, the main result of of Alger and Weibull (2013) on the evolution of stable other regarding preferences does not hold. Instead, both non-Nash and Pareto inefficient behavior are evolutionarily unstable.
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- Bomze Immanuel M. & Weibull Jorgen W., 1995. "Does Neutral Stability Imply Lyapunov Stability?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 173-192, November.
- U. Dieckmann & M. Doebeli, 1999. "On the Origin of Species by Sympatric Speciation," Working Papers ir99013, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
- Ingela Alger & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2013.
"Homo Moralis—Preference Evolution Under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching,"
Econometric Society, vol. 81(6), pages 2269-2302, November.
- Ingela Alger & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2012. "Homo Moralis: Preference Evolution under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching," Carleton Economic Papers 12-01, Carleton University, Department of Economics, revised 14 May 2012.
- Alger, Ingela & Weibull, JÃ¶rgen, 2012. "Homo Moralis-Preference evolution under incomplete information and assortative matching," LERNA Working Papers 12.17.374, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
- Alger, Ingela & Weibull, Jörgen W., 2012. "Homo Moralis-Preference evolution under incomplete information and assortative matching," TSE Working Papers 12-281, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).