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The preferences of Homo Moralis are unstable under evolving assortativity


  • Newton, Jonathan


Differing degrees of assortativity in matching can be expected to have both genetic and cultural determinants. When assortativity is subject to evolution, the main result of of Alger and Weibull (2013) on the evolution of stable other regarding preferences does not hold. Instead, both non-Nash and Pareto inefficient behavior are evolutionarily unstable.

Suggested Citation

  • Newton, Jonathan, 2014. "The preferences of Homo Moralis are unstable under evolving assortativity," Working Papers 2014-14, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:syd:wpaper:2014-14

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Bomze Immanuel M. & Weibull Jorgen W., 1995. "Does Neutral Stability Imply Lyapunov Stability?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 173-192, November.
    2. U. Dieckmann & M. Doebeli, 1999. "On the Origin of Species by Sympatric Speciation," Working Papers ir99013, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
    3. Ingela Alger & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2013. "Homo Moralis—Preference Evolution Under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(6), pages 2269-2302, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:gam:jgames:v:8:y:2017:i:4:p:50-:d:119204 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Nax, Heinrich H. & Rigos, Alexandros, 2015. "Assortativity evolving from social dilemmas," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 65447, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    3. Jiabin Wu, 2016. "Evolving assortativity and social conventions," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 36(2), pages 936-941.
    4. repec:eee:ecolet:v:163:y:2018:i:c:p:146-148 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item


    evolution; moral values; assortative matching;

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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