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Assortativity evolving from social dilemmas

Author

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  • Alexandros Rigos

    ()

  • Heinrich H. Nax

    ()

Abstract

Assortative mechanisms can overcome tragedies of the commons that otherwise result in dilemma situations. Assortativity criteria include genetics (e.g. kin selection), preferences (e.g. homophily), locations (e.g. spatial interaction) and actions (e.g. meritocracy), usually presuming an exogenously fixed matching mechanism. Here, we endogenize the matching process with the aim of investigating how assortativity itself, jointly with cooperation, is driven by evolution. Our main finding is that only full-or-null assortativities turn out to be long-run stable, their relative stabilities depending on the exact incentive structure of the underlying social dilemma. The resulting social loss is evaluated for general classes of dilemma games, thus quantifying to what extent tragedy of the commons may be endogenously overcome.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexandros Rigos & Heinrich H. Nax, 2015. "Assortativity evolving from social dilemmas," Discussion Papers in Economics 15/19, Department of Economics, University of Leicester.
  • Handle: RePEc:lec:leecon:15/19
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:gam:jgames:v:8:y:2017:i:4:p:50-:d:119204 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Jiabin Wu, 2016. "Evolving assortativity and social conventions," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 36(2), pages 936-941.
    3. Jensen, Martin Kaae & Rigos, Alexandros, 2017. "Evolutionary Games and Matching Rules," Working Papers 2017:11, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 06 Mar 2018.
    4. Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli & Jiabin Wu, 2016. "The Interplay of Cultural Aversion and Assortativity for the Emergence of Cooperation," Center for Economic Research (RECent) 121, University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics "Marco Biagi".
    5. Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli & Jiabin Wuz, 2016. "The Interplay of Cultural Aversion and Assortativity for the Emergence of Cooperation," Department of Economics 0084, University of Modena and Reggio E., Faculty of Economics "Marco Biagi".

    More about this item

    Keywords

    cooperation; (co-)evolution; assortativity; democratic consensus;

    JEL classification:

    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General

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