Evolutionary Games with Group Selection
This paper introduces two new concepts in evolutionary game theory; Nash equilibrium with Group Selection (NEGS) and Evolutionary Stable Strategy with Group Selection (ESSGS). These concepts generalize Maynard Smith and Price (1973) to settings with arbitrary matching rules, in particular they reduce, respectively, to Nash equilibrium and ESS when matching is random. NEGS are ESSGS are to the canonical group selection model of evolutionary theory what Nash Equilibrium and ESS are the standard replicator dynamics: any NEGS is a steady state, any stable steady state is a NEGS, and any ESSGS is asymptotically stable. We exploit this to prove what may be called "the second welfare theorem of evolution": Any evolutionary optimum will be a BEGS under some matching rule. Our results are illustrated in Hawk-Dove, Prisoners' dilemma, and Stage Hunt games.
|Date of creation:||Dec 2012|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT|
Web page: http://www.economics.bham.ac.uk
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Simon Gachter & Ernst Fehr, 2000.
"Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September.
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, 1999. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," CESifo Working Paper Series 183, CESifo Group Munich.
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, . "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," IEW - Working Papers 010, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Wolfgang Leininger, 2006. "Fending off one means fending off all: evolutionary stability in quasi-submodular aggregative games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(3), pages 713-719, November.
- Paul Sharp & Jacob Weisdorf, 2007.
"From Preventive to Permissive Checks: The Changing Nature of the Malthusian Relationship Between Nuptiality and the Price of Provisions in the Nineteenth Century,"
Economics Series Working Papers
67, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Carlsson, H. & van Damme, E.E.C., 1993.
"Global games and equilibrium selection,"
Other publications TiSEM
49a54f00-dcec-4fc1-9488-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Hans Carlsson & Eric van Damme, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001088, David K. Levine.
- Carlsson, H. & van Damme, E.E.C., 1990. "Global games and equilibrium selection," Discussion Paper 1990-52, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Carlsson, H. & Van Damme, E., 1990. "Global Games And Equilibrium Selection," Papers 9052, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1997.
"The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior,"
Econometric Society, vol. 65(2), pages 375-384, March.
- Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
- Eshel, Ilan & Samuelson, Larry & Shaked, Avner, 1998. "Altruists, Egoists, and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 157-79, March.
- P. Young, 1999. "The Evolution of Conventions," Levine's Working Paper Archive 485, David K. Levine.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1979. "Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-9, August.
- Ingela Alger & Jörgen Weibull, 2009.
"Kinship, Incentives and Evolution,"
- Larry Samuelson, 2002. "Evolution and Game Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 47-66, Spring.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bir:birmec:13-05. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Colin Rowat)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.