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The evolution of social norms: With managerial implications

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  • Kolstad, Ivar

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  • Kolstad, Ivar, 2007. "The evolution of social norms: With managerial implications," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 58-72, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:36:y:2007:i:1:p:58-72
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    21. Ivar Kolstad, 2005. "Evolution With Endogenous Mutations," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 7(02), pages 229-240.
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    23. Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 278-305, August.
    24. Boyer, Robert & Orlean, Andre, 1992. "How Do Conventions Evolve?," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 165-177, October.
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    26. Berthon, Pierre & Pitt, Leyland F. & Ewing, Michael T. & Bakkeland, Gunnar, 2003. "Norms and power in marketing relationships: Alternative theories and empirical evidence," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 56(9), pages 699-709, September.
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    1. Kolstad, Ivar & Wiig, Arne, 2009. "Is Transparency the Key to Reducing Corruption in Resource-Rich Countries?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 521-532, March.
    2. Alexander, Phyllis & Balavac-Orlic, Merima, 2022. "Tax morale: Framing and fairness," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 46(1).
    3. Cartwright, Edward, 2009. "Social norms: Does it matter whether agents are rational or boundedly rational?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 403-410, June.
    4. Liu, Yanju & Lu, Hai & Veenstra, Kevin, 2014. "Is sin always a sin? The interaction effect of social norms and financial incentives on market participants’ behavior," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 289-307.
    5. Arce, Daniel G., 2010. "Corporate virtue: Treatment of whistle blowers and the punishment of violators," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 363-371, September.
    6. Benjamin Foster, 2011. "Norms and Costs of Government Domestic Violence Policies: A Critical Review," Journal of Family and Economic Issues, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 140-151, March.
    7. Kolstad, Ivar & Wiig, Arne, 2009. "It's the rents, stupid! The political economy of the resource curse," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 5317-5325, December.
    8. Chih, Yao-Yu, 2016. "Social network structure and government provision crowding-out on voluntary contributions," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 83-90.

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