Corporate virtue: Treatment of whistle blowers and the punishment of violators
An evolutionary game-theoretic model is employed to address three essential aspects of whistle blowing: ethical decision making, the duality of mutual accountability among cohorts in large organizations, and role conflict between individual and organizational values. I derive an equilibrium condition relating the treatment of whistle blowers to the punishment of violators. The model facilitates an evaluation of the whistle blowing provisions in the Sarbanes-Oxley (2002) Act.
References listed on IDEAS
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