Fighting Pollution When Decisions Are Strategic
In this paper, the author analyzes antipollution policies in a 2-by-2 game played between a 'polluter' and the 'police' in which the payoffs can be manipulated by an exogenous third player called the 'policymaker.' He shows that the efficiency of the policies may depend on whether the players of the 2-by-2 game choose Nash equilibrium strategies or prefer maximin. Copyright 1993 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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