Wallenstein’s Power Problem and Its Consequences
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsPower; bargaining; mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium; theater; Wallenstein;
All these keywords.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
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