Bayesian Monitoring
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More about this item
Keywords
Imperfect Decision-Making; Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium; Enforcement; Maximum Fine Result;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
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