A Certain Uncertainty; Assessment of Court Decisions in Tackling Corruption in Indonesia
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- Rimawan Pradiptyo, 2015. "A Certain Uncertainty; Assessment of Court Decisions in Tackling Corruption in Indonesia," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: R N Ghosh & M A B Siddique (ed.), CORRUPTION, GOOD GOVERNANCE and ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT Contemporary Analysis and Case Studies, chapter 10, pages 167-215, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
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Cited by:
- Saputra, Sony & Pradiptyo, Rimawan, 2012. "On Assessment of the Supreme Court Decisions in Tackling Substance Misuse in Indonesia," MPRA Paper 36381, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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More about this item
Keywords
Corruption; Legal Certainty; Financial Punishment; Social Costs of Crime; Explicit Cost of Corruption; Deterrence Effect;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
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