A Certain Uncertainty; Assessment of Court Decisions in Tackling Corruption in Indonesia
This paper aims to assess court decisions for erradicating corruption in Indonesia. The data are based on Indonesia Supreme court decisions from year 2001 to year 2009. The data set comprises of 549 cases involving 831 defendants. After the end of Suharto’s regime, the Anti Corruption Bill was ratified in 1999 and was refined in 2001. As Indonesia follows civil law system, legal certainty has been manifested by stating the level of punishment clearly for each type of offences in the Bill. Despite a clear guidance on the intensity of punishments for each corruption types, judges’ decisions on the intensity of punishments sentenced across defendants are far from consistent. Using logistic regressions, we found that the probability of judges in sentencing defendants with financial punishments (i.e. fines, compensation and the seizure of evidence) does not depend on the level of economic losses inflicted by the defendants. On the contrary, the judges’ decisions tend to be more lenient toward defendants with particular occupations but harsher toward the others. The intensity of punishments has been sentenced idiosyncratically and has weakened the deterrence effect of the punishments. In estimating the social cost of corruption, prosecutors have estimated only the explicit cost of corruption, therefore the impact of corruption to Indonesia economy is under underestimated. Brand and Price (2000) defined that the social costs of crime includes the costs in anticipation of crime, the costs as a result of crime and the costs in reaction of crime. The total explicit cost of corruption from 2001 to 2009 was Rp 73.1 trillion (about US $8.49 billion), however the total financial punishment imposed by the supreme court was Rp 5.33 trillion (about US$619.77 million). The data show that corruption is mostly committed by people with medium-high income and they usually have good careers.
|Date of creation:||30 Aug 2011|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Gary S. Becker, 1974.
"Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,"
NBER Chapters,in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gary S. Becker, 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169-169.
- Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 2001. "Corruption and optimal law enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 1-24, July.
- A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1999. "Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement," NBER Working Papers 6945, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Polinsky, Mitchell, 1999. "Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt35h389gd, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
- Luciano Andreozzi, 2004. "Rewarding Policemen Increases Crime. Another Surprising Result from the Inspection Game," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 69-82, October.
- Rasmusen, Eric, 1996. "Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(2), pages 519-543, October.
- Rasmusen, E., 1992. "Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality," Papers 92-019, Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research.
- Eric Rasmusen, 1995. "``Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality''," Law and Economics 9506001, EconWPA.
- Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March.
- A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1999. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," NBER Working Papers 6993, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bowles, Roger & Garoupa, Nuno, 1997. "Casual police corruption and the economics of crime," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 75-87, March.
- S. Illeris & G. Akehurst, 2001. "Introduction," The Service Industries Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(1), pages 1-4, January.
- Jack Hirshleifer & Eric Rasmusen, 1992. "Are Equilibrium Strategies Unaffected by Incentives?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 4(3), pages 353-367, July.
- Jack Hirshleifer & Eric Rasmusen, 1990. "Are Equilibrium Strategies Unaffected by Incentives," UCLA Economics Working Papers 595, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Garoupa, Nuno & Klerman, Daniel, 2004. "Corruption and the optimal use of nonmonetary sanctions," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 219-225, June.
- Nuno Garoupa & Daniel Klerman, 2002. "Optimal Law Enforcement with a Rent-Seeking Government," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 116-140, January.
- Garoupa, Nuno, 1997. " The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(3), pages 267-295, September.
- Brand, Sam & Price, Richard, 2000. "The economic and social costs of crime," MPRA Paper 74968, University Library of Munich, Germany. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:36382. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.