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Crime, credible enforcement, and multiple equilibria

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  • Baker, Matthew J.
  • Miceli, Thomas J.

Abstract

This paper examines the credibility of threats to punish criminal offenders. The motivation is the sequential nature of crime and punishment, which unfolds as follows: enforcers threaten punishment, offenders commit crimes (or are deterred), and enforcers (possibly comprising different decision makers) enact punishments. The cost of carrying out threatened punishments after the fact is what potentially undermines the credibility of the initial threat. The model shows that, given the sequential nature of the crime and punishment game, multiple equilibria are possible entailing different crime rates. Changes in law enforcement policy over recent decades are discussed in light of the results.

Suggested Citation

  • Baker, Matthew J. & Miceli, Thomas J., 2021. "Crime, credible enforcement, and multiple equilibria," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:68:y:2021:i:c:s0144818821000545
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2021.106030
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    Cited by:

    1. Menegatti, Mario, 2023. "Variability in punishment, risk preferences and crime deterrence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Crime and punishment; Credibility; Deterrence;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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