IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/rlecon/v3y2007i2n2.html

Does Punishment Matter? A Refinement of the Inspection Game

Author

Listed:
  • Pradiptyo Rimawan

    (University of York)

Abstract

We attempt to revise the inspection game used by George Tsebelis to model phenomena in criminal justice. The refinement has been conducted by disaggregating the game payoffs and then using findings from empirical studies to reconstruct the game. In contrast to Tsebelis' propositions, we find that the severity of punishment may affect the offending behavior of individuals. The result also holds for the case in which the authority initiates crime prevention programs, by providing incentives to those who do not have a criminal history. The impact of increasing the severity of punishment on reducing individuals' offending behavior is less certain than that of instigating crime prevention programs. This result holds so long as the authority does not alter the levels of enforcement.

Suggested Citation

  • Pradiptyo Rimawan, 2007. "Does Punishment Matter? A Refinement of the Inspection Game," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(2), pages 197-219, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:3:y:2007:i:2:n:2
    DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1099
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.2202/1555-5879.1099
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.2202/1555-5879.1099?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or

    for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Shidiqi, khalifany ash & Pradiptyo, rimawan, 2011. "A game theoretical analysis of economic sanction," MPRA Paper 30481, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Baker, Matthew J. & Miceli, Thomas J., 2021. "Crime, credible enforcement, and multiple equilibria," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    3. Puneet Agarwal & Kyle Hunt & Shivasubramanian Srinivasan & Jun Zhuang, 2020. "Fire Code Inspection and Compliance: A Game-Theoretic Model Between Fire Inspection Agencies and Building Owners," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 17(3), pages 208-226, September.
    4. Bruno Chiarini & Elisabetta Marzano, 2016. "Is the Severity of the Penalty an Effective Deterrent? A Strategic Approach for the Crime of Tax Evasion," CESifo Working Paper Series 6112, CESifo.
    5. John Bone & Dominic Spengler, 2014. "Does Reporting Decrease Corruption?," Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, , vol. 26(1-2), pages 161-186, January.
    6. van der Weele Joël, 2012. "Beyond the State of Nature: Introducing Social Interactions in the Economic Model of Crime," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(2), pages 401-432, October.
    7. Anthony Rossiter & Susan M Hester, 2017. "Designing Biosecurity Inspection Regimes to Account for Stakeholder Incentives: An Inspection Game Approach," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 93(301), pages 277-301, June.
    8. Spengler Dominic, 2014. "Endogenous Detection of Collaborative Crime: The Case of Corruption," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(2), pages 201-217, July.
    9. Dominic Spengler, 2012. "Endogenising Detection in an Asymmetric Penalties Corruption Game," Discussion Papers 12/20, Department of Economics, University of York.
    10. Cabo, Francisco & Martín-Herrán, Guiomar & Ramos, Laís, 2025. "Environmental regulation and tax evasion when the regulator has incomplete information," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:3:y:2007:i:2:n:2. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyterbrill.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.