The tax evasion social multiplier: Evidence from Italy
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.01.003
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- Roberto Galbiati & Giulio Zanella, 2012. "The tax evasion social multiplier: Evidence from Italy," Post-Print hal-01410557, HAL.
- Roberto Galbiati & Giulio Zanella, 2012. "The tax evasion social multiplier: Evidence from Italy," Post-Print hal-03574131, HAL.
- Roberto Galbiati & Giulio Zanella, 2012. "The tax evasion social multiplier: Evidence from Italy," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/2jbidihgpo8, Sciences Po.
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More about this item
Keywords
Social interactions; Neighborhood effects; Social multiplier; Tax evasion; Tax compliance; Excess variance;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
- C31 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models; Quantile Regressions; Social Interaction Models
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
- Z19 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Other
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