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Tax evasion and social information: an experiment in Belgium, France, and the Netherlands

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Listed:
  • LEFEBVRE, Mathieu
  • PESTIEAU, Pierre
  • RIEDL, Arno
  • VILLEVAL, Marie Claire

Abstract

We experimentally study how receiving information about tax compliance of others affects individuals’ occupational choices and subsequent evading decisions. In one treatment individuals receive information about the highest tax evasion rates of others in past experimental sessions with no such social information; in another treatment they receive information about the lowest tax evasion rates observed in the past sessions with no such social information. We observe an asymmetric effect of social information on tax compliance. Whereas examples of high compliance do not have any disciplining effect, we find evidence that examples of low compliance significantly increase tax evasion for certain audit probabilities. No major differences are found across countries. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • LEFEBVRE, Mathieu & PESTIEAU, Pierre & RIEDL, Arno & VILLEVAL, Marie Claire, 2015. "Tax evasion and social information: an experiment in Belgium, France, and the Netherlands," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2648, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:2648
    Note: In : International Tax and Public Finance, 22 (3) 2015, p. 401-425
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    JEL classification:

    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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