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The Impact of Social Pressure on Tax Compliance: a Field Experiment

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  • Pietro Battiston
  • Simona Gamba

Abstract

We study the effect of social pressure on tax compliance, focusing on the compliance of shop sellers to the legal obligation of releasing tax receipts for each sale. We carry out a field experiment on bakeries in Italy, where a strong gap exists between the legal obligation and the actual behavior of sellers. Social pressure is manipulated by means of an explicit request for a receipt when not released. We employ an innovative approach to the identification of the treatment effect. We find that a single request for a receipt causes a 17 per cent rise in the probability of a receipt being released for a sale occurring shortly thereafter, causing on average more than two receipts to be released. We also find strong evidence of persistence in compliance decisions.

Suggested Citation

  • Pietro Battiston & Simona Gamba, 2016. "The Impact of Social Pressure on Tax Compliance: a Field Experiment," FBK-IRVAPP Working Papers 2016-04, Research Institute for the Evaluation of Public Policies (IRVAPP), Bruno Kessler Foundation.
    • Handle: RePEc:fbk:wpaper:2016-04
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Jia, Z. Tingting & McMahon, Matthew J., 2020. "Being watched in an investment game setting: Behavioral changes when making risky decisions," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 88(C).
    3. Pietro Battiston & Denvil Duncan & Simona Gamba & Alessandro Santoro, 2016. "Audit publicity and tax compliance: a quasi-natural experiment," LEM Papers Series 2016/40, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
    4. Thu Hien Nguyen, 2022. "The Impact of Non-Economic Factors on Voluntary Tax Compliance Behavior: A Case Study of Small and Medium Enterprises in Vietnam," Economies, MDPI, vol. 10(8), pages 1-18, July.
    5. Pietro Battiston & Denvil Duncan & Simona Gamba & Alessandro Santoro, 2016. "The Italian Blitz: a natural experiment on audit publicity and tax compliance," FBK-IRVAPP Working Papers 2016-10, Research Institute for the Evaluation of Public Policies (IRVAPP), Bruno Kessler Foundation.
    6. Pietro Battiston & Denvil Duncan & Simona Gamba & Alessandro Santoro, 2020. "Audit Publicity and Tax Compliance: A Natural Experiment," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 122(1), pages 81-108, January.
    7. Tegegne, Yitagesu Tekle & Ramcilovic-Suominen, Sabaheta & Kotilainen, Juha & Winkel, Georg & Haywood, Andrew & Almaw, Addisu, 2022. "What drives forest rule compliance behaviour in the Congo Basin? A study of local communities in Cameroon," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 115(C).
    8. Larissa Batrancea, 2021. "An Econometric Approach Regarding the Impact of Fiscal Pressure on Equilibrium: Evidence from Electricity, Gas and Oil Companies Listed on the New York Stock Exchange," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(6), pages 1-22, March.
    9. James Alm, 2019. "What Motivates Tax Compliance?," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(2), pages 353-388, April.
    10. López-Pérez, Raúl & Ramirez-Zamudio, Aldo, 2020. "An experimental test of two policies to increase donations to public projects," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    11. Vanina Adoriana Trifan & Silviu Gabriel Szentesi & Lavinia Denisia Cuc & Mioara Florina Pantea, 2023. "Assessing Tax Compliance Behavior Among Romanian Taxpayers: An Empirical Case Study," SAGE Open, , vol. 13(3), pages 21582440231, September.
    12. Fabio Lamantia & Mario Pezzino, 2021. "Social norms and evolutionary tax compliance," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 89(4), pages 385-405, July.
    13. Larissa M. Batrancea & Anca Nichita & Ruggero Agostini & Fabricio Batista Narcizo & Denis Forte & Samuel Paiva Neves Mamede & Ana Maria Roux-Cesar & Bozhidar Nedev & Leoš Vitek & József Pántya & Aidin, 2022. "A self-employed taxpayer experimental study on trust, power, and tax compliance in eleven countries," Financial Innovation, Springer;Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, vol. 8(1), pages 1-23, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tax evasion; field experiment; peer pressure; social pressure;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm
    • K34 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Tax Law

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