You've Got Mail: A Randomised Field Experiment on Tax Evasion
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- Bott, Kristina Maria & Cappelen, Alexander W. & Sørensen, Erik Ø. & Tungodden, Bertil, 2017. "You’ve got mail: A randomised Field experiment on tax evasion," Discussion Paper Series in Economics 10/2017, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics.
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Cited by:
- Jan-Emmanuel De Neve & Clément Imbert & Johannes Spinnewijn & Teodora Tsankova & Maarten Luts, 2021.
"How to Improve Tax Compliance? Evidence from Population-Wide Experiments in Belgium,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 129(5), pages 1425-1463.
- Jan-Emmanuel De Neve & Clement Imbert & Maarten Luts & Johannes Spinnewijn & Teodora Tsankova, 2019. "How to improve tax compliance? Evidence from population-wide experiments in Belgium," CEP Discussion Papers dp1621, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- De Neve, Jan-Emmanuel & Imbert, Clement & Spinnewijn, Johannes & Tsankova, Teodora & Luts, Maarten, 2020. "How to Improve Tax Compliance? Evidence from Population-wide Experiments in Belgium," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 458, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
- De Neve, Jan-Emmanuel & Imbert, Clement & Spinnewijn , Johannes & Tsankova, Teodora & Luts, Maarten, 2021. "How to improve tax compliance? Evidence from population-wide experiments in Belgium," Other publications TiSEM b20f188f-8142-484a-bb21-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Spinnewijn, Johannes & De Neve, Jan-Emmanuel & Imbert, Clément & Tsankova, Teodora & Luts, Maarten, 2019. "How to Improve Tax Compliance? Evidence from Population-wide Experiments in Belgium," CEPR Discussion Papers 13733, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- De Neve, Jan-Emmanuel & Imbert, Clement & Spinnewijn, Johannes & Tsankova, Teodora & Luts, Maarten, 2021. "How to improve tax compliance? Evidence from population-wide experiments in Belgium," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 106265, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- De Neve, Jan-Emmanuel & Imbert, Clement & Spinnewijn, Johannes & Tsankova, Teodora & Luts, Maarten, 2019. "How to improve tax compliance? Evidence from population-wide experiments in Belgium," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 102725, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- De Neve, Jan-Emmanuel & Imbert Clement & Spinnewijn, Johannes & Tsankova, Teodora & Luts, Maarten, 2020. "How to Improve Tax Compliance? Evidence from Population-wide Experiments in Belgium," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1252, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- De Neve, Jan-Emmanuel & Imbert, Clement & Spinnewijn, Johannes & Tsankova, Teodora & Luts, Maarten, 2019. "How to Improve Tax Compliance? Evidence from Population-wide Experiments in Belgium," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1194, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Elena Kantorowicz‐Reznichenko & Jaroslaw Kantorowicz, 2021. "To follow or not to follow the herd? Transparency and social norm nudges," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 74(3), pages 362-377, August.
- Jacquemet, N. & Luchini, S. & Malézieux, A. & Shogren, J.F., 2020.
"Who’ll stop lying under oath? Empirical evidence from tax evasion games,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stephane Luchini & Antoine Malezieux & Jason Shogren, 2019. "Who'll stop lying under oath ? Empirical evidence from Tax Evasion Games," Working Papers halshs-02159905, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stephane Luchini & A. Malézieux & Jason F. Shogren, 2020. "Who’ll stop lying under oath? Empirical evidence from tax evasion games," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-02576845, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stephane Luchini & A. Malézieux & Jason F. Shogren, 2020. "Who’ll stop lying under oath? Empirical evidence from tax evasion games," Post-Print hal-02576845, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stephane Luchini & Antoine Malezieux & Jason Shogren, 2019. "Who'll stop lying under oath ? Empirical evidence from Tax Evasion Games," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-02159905, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stephane Luchini & A. Malézieux & Jason F. Shogren, 2020. "Who’ll stop lying under oath? Empirical evidence from tax evasion games," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-02576845, HAL.
- Miguel Almunia & Jarkko Harju & Kaisa Kotakorpi & Janne Tukiainen & Jouko Verho, 2019.
"Expanding access to administrative data: the case of tax authorities in Finland and the UK,"
International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 26(3), pages 661-676, June.
- Almunia, Miguel & Harju, Jarkko & Kotakorpi, Kaisa & Tukiainen, Janne & Verho, Jouko, 2018. "Expanding access to administrative data: the case of tax authorities in Finland and the UK," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 90617, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Antinyan, Armenak & Asatryan, Zareh, 2019.
"Nudging for tax compliance: A meta-analysis,"
ZEW Discussion Papers
19-055, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Armenak Antinyan & Zareh Asatryan, 2020. "Nudging for Tax Compliance: A Meta-Analysis," CESifo Working Paper Series 8500, CESifo.
- Antinyan, Armenak & Asatryan, Zareh, 2024. "Nudging for tax compliance: A meta-analysis," ZEW Discussion Papers 24-054, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Tsikas, Stefanos A. & Wagener, Andreas, 2018. "Bringing Tax Avoiders to Light: Moral Framing and Shaming in a Public Goods Experiment," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-633, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
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Keywords
; ; ;JEL classification:
- C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
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