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The Minnesota Income Tax Compliance Experiment: Replication of the Social Norms Experiment

Author

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  • Coleman, Stephen

Abstract

This research note reports the results of a follow-up experiment conducted to validate an earlier experiment showing that if taxpayers overestimate the prevalence of tax evasion, their voluntary compliance can be increased by informing them about the true rate of cheating. The result confirms that tax compliance is influenced partly by social conformity with perceived social norms against cheating. The experiments were done by the Minnesota Department of Revenue in 1995 and 1996, but only the first experiment has been publicly reported to date (Coleman, 1996).

Suggested Citation

  • Coleman, Stephen, 2007. "The Minnesota Income Tax Compliance Experiment: Replication of the Social Norms Experiment," MPRA Paper 5820, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:5820
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5820/1/MPRA_paper_5820.pdf
    File Function: original version
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Coleman, Stephen, 1996. "The Minnesota income tax compliance experiment: State tax results," MPRA Paper 4827, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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    Citations

    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Who cares if you don’t pay your taxes?
      by Guest blogger in Eval Central on 2013-12-19 17:30:08

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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    Cited by:

    1. Castro, Lucio & Scartascini, Carlos, 2015. "Tax compliance and enforcement in the pampas evidence from a field experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 65-82.
    2. repec:exl:22evid:v:2017:y:2017:i:1:p:- is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Bott, Kristina Maria & Cappelen, Alexander W. & Sørensen, Erik Ø. & Tungodden, Bertil, 2017. "You’ve got mail: A randomised Field experiment on tax evasion," Discussion Paper Series in Economics 10/2017, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics.
    4. repec:spr:sochwe:v:49:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s00355-017-1029-9 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Daniel Ortega & Carlos Scartascini, 2015. "Don't Blame the Messenger: A Field Experiment on Delivery Methods for Increasing Tax Compliance," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 91741, Inter-American Development Bank.
    6. Biddle, Nicholas & Fels, Katja & Sinning, Mathias, 2017. "Behavioral insights and business taxation: Evidence from two randomized controlled trials," Ruhr Economic Papers 698, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    7. Daniel Ortega & Carlos Scartascini, 2015. "Don't Blame the Messenger: A Field Experiment on Delivery Methods for Increasing Tax Compliance," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 7284, Inter-American Development Bank.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tax compliance; experiment; social norms; social conformity;

    JEL classification:

    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
    • Z1 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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