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Monitoring and enforcement of environmental regulations. Lessons from a natural field experiment in Norway

Relying on a small natural field experiment with random assignment of treatments, I estimate effects of three core elements of most monitoring and enforcement practices: self-reporting, audit frequency and specific deterrence. I find evidence of evasive reporting of violations in self-audits, as more violations are detected in on-site audits than in self-audits. Announcing the increased audit frequency has no effect on compliance, but an audit raises the firm’s subsequent compliance substantially.

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Paper provided by Research Department of Statistics Norway in its series Discussion Papers with number 680.

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Date of creation: Feb 2012
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Handle: RePEc:ssb:dispap:680
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