No Taxation without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in the Value Added Tax
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- Dina Pomeranz, 2015. "No Taxation without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in the Value Added Tax," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(8), pages 2539-2569, August.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
- O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
- O23 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Fiscal and Monetary Policy in Development
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ACC-2013-07-15 (Accounting and Auditing)
- NEP-IUE-2013-07-15 (Informal and Underground Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2013-07-15 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2013-07-15 (Public Finance)
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