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Testing Enforcement Strategies in the Field: Legal Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information

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  • Gerlinde Fellner
  • Rupert Sausgruber
  • Christian Traxler

Abstract

We run a large-scale natural field experiment to evaluate alternative strategies to en- force compliance with the law. The experiment varies the text of mailings sent to potential evaders of TV license fees. We find a strong alert effect of mailings, leading to a substantial increase in compliance. Among different mailing conditions a legal threat that stresses a high detection risk has a significant and highly robust deterrent effect. Neither appealing to morals nor imparting information about others' behavior enhances compliance. However, the information condition has a positive effect in municipalities where evasion is believed to be common. Overall, the economic model of crime performs remarkably well in explaining our data.

Suggested Citation

  • Gerlinde Fellner & Rupert Sausgruber & Christian Traxler, 2009. "Testing Enforcement Strategies in the Field: Legal Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information," NRN working papers 2009-23, The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
    • Handle: RePEc:jku:nrnwps:2009_23
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Field experiments; law enforcement; compliance; deterrence;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments

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