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Punishment ? and beyond

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  • Bruno S. Frey

Abstract

This paper argues that the ?Economics of Crime? concentrates too much on punishment as a policy to fight crime, which is unwise for several reasons. There are important instances in which punishment simply cannot reduce crime. Several feasible alternatives to punishment exist, such as offering positive incentives or handing out awards for law abiding behavior. These alternative approaches tend to create a positive sum environment. When people appreciate living in a society that is to a large extent law abiding, they are more motivated to observe the law.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruno S. Frey, 2009. "Punishment ? and beyond," CREMA Working Paper Series 2009-14, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    • Handle: RePEc:cra:wpaper:2009-14
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    Cited by:

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    2. Gerlinde Fellner & Rupert Sausgruber & Christian Traxler, 2009. "Testing Enforcement Strategies in the Field: Legal Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information," Working Papers 2009-23, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
    3. Ebele Stella Nwokoye & Clement Izuchukwu Igbanugo & Chukwunonso Ekesiobi & Stephen Kelechi Dimnwobi, 2023. "Fiscal Incentives and Tax Compliance Behaviour in Industrial Clusters: A Survey of Clusters in South-east Nigeria," Journal of African Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(1), pages 147-166, January.
    4. Gerlinde Fellner & Rupert Sausgruber & Christian Traxler, 2013. "Testing Enforcement Strategies In The Field: Threat, Moral Appeal And Social Information," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 634-660, June.
    5. G. Candela & E. Randon & A. E. Scorcu, 2012. "L imposta sul valore aggiunto: regime ordinario e regime del margine a confronto. Il caso del mercato dell arte. A general comparison between different VAT Regimes: the normal vs the special scheme. A," Working Papers wp838, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Crime; Punishment; Incentives; Motivation; Framing; Broken Window Theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

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