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Market Provision of Broadcasting: A Welfare Analysis

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  • Simon P. Anderson
  • Stephen Coate

Abstract

This paper presents a theory of the market provision of broadcasting and uses it to address the nature of market failure in the industry. Equilibrium advertising levels may be too low or too high, depending on the nuisance cost to viewers, the substitutability of programmes, and the expected benefits to advertisers from contacting viewers. The equilibrium amount of programming may also be below or above the socially optimal level. Perhaps surprisingly, the ability to price programming may reduce social surplus, while monopoly ownership may increase it. Copyright 2005, Wiley-Blackwell.

Suggested Citation

  • Simon P. Anderson & Stephen Coate, 2005. "Market Provision of Broadcasting: A Welfare Analysis," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 72(4), pages 947-972.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:72:y:2005:i:4:p:947-972
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/0034-6527.00357
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media

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