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Platform Ownership

Author

Listed:
  • Nocke, Volker
  • Peitz, Martin
  • Stahl, Konrad

Abstract

We develop a general theoretical framework of trade on a platform on which buyers and sellers interact. The platform may be owned by a single large, or many small independent or vertically integrated intermediaries. There also may be free entry into the market for platform slots, or platform owners my form a club that restricts entry. We provide a positive and normative analysis of the impact of platform ownership structure on platform size. The strength of network effects is important in the ranking of ownership structures by induced equilibrium platform size and welfare. We develop an intuitive taxonomy of these towards developing our results. We show that while vertical integration may be welfare-enhancing if network effects are weak, monopoly platform ownership is socially preferred if they are strong. These are also the ownership structures likely to emerge.

Suggested Citation

  • Nocke, Volker & Peitz, Martin & Stahl, Konrad, 2004. "Platform Ownership," CEPR Discussion Papers 4657, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4657
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    intermediation; network effects; product diversity; two-sided markets;

    JEL classification:

    • D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
    • L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General

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