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Who'll stop lying under oath? Empirical evidence from Tax Evasion Games

Author

Listed:
  • Nicolas Jacquemet

    () (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Stephane Luchini

    () (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Antoine Malezieux

    (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Jason Shogren

    () (UW - University of Wyoming)

Abstract

Using two earned income/tax declaration experimental designs we show that only partial liars are affected by a truth-telling oath, a non-price commitment device. Under oath, we see no change in the number of chronic liars and fewer partial liars. Rather than smoothly increasing their compliance, we also observe that partial liars who respond to the oath, respond by becoming fully honest under oath. Based on both response times data and the consistency of subjects when several compliance decisions are made in a row, we show that partial lying arises as the result of weak preferences towards profitable honesty. The oath only transforms people with weak preferences for lying into being committed to the truth.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolas Jacquemet & Stephane Luchini & Antoine Malezieux & Jason Shogren, 2019. "Who'll stop lying under oath? Empirical evidence from Tax Evasion Games," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-02159905, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-02159905
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02159905
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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