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Coordination with communication under oath

Author

Listed:
  • Nicolas Jacquemet

    () (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne, PSE - Paris School of Economics)

  • Stéphane Luchini

    (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - ECM - Ecole Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales)

  • Jason Shogren

    (Departement of Economics and Finance, University of Wyoming - UW - University of Wyoming)

  • Adam Zylbersztejn

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

We focus on the design of an institutional device aimed to foster coordination through communication. We explore whether the social psychology theory of commitment, implemented via a truth-telling oath, can reduce coordination failure. Using a classic coordination game, we ask all players to sign voluntarily a truth-telling oath before playing the game with cheap talk communication. Three results emerge with commitment under oath: (1) coordination increased by nearly 50 percent; (2) senders' messages were significantly more truthful and actions more efficient, and (3) receivers' trust of messages increased.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolas Jacquemet & Stéphane Luchini & Jason Shogren & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2018. "Coordination with communication under oath," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01480525, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-01480525
    DOI: 10.1007/s10683-016-9508-x
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01480525
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Samuel Ferey & Yannick Gabuthy & Nicolas Jacquemet, 2013. "L'apport de l'économie expérimentale dans l'élaboration des politiques publiques," Revue française d'économie, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(2), pages 155-194.
    2. Nicolas Jacquemet & Stéphane Luchini & Julie Rosaz & Jason Shogren, 2015. "Truth-telling under Oath," Post-Print halshs-01224135, HAL.
    3. Fluet, Claude & Galbiati, Rpbertp, 2016. "Lois et normes : les enseignements de l'économie comportementale," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 92(1-2), pages 191-215, Mars-Juin.
    4. Nicolas Jacquemet & Alexander James & Stéphane Luchini & Jason F. Shogren, 2017. "Referenda Under Oath," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 67(3), pages 479-504, July.
    5. Koessler, Ann-Kathrin & Page, Lionel & Dulleck, Uwe, 2015. "Promoting pro-social behavior with public statements of good intent," MPRA Paper 80072, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 24 May 2017.
    6. Samuel Ferey & Yannick Gabuthy & Nicolas Jacquemet, 2013. "L'apport de l'économie expérimentale dans l'élaboration des politiques publiques," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-00879205, HAL.

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    Keywords

    Oath; Cheap talk communication; Coordination game;

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