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What drives failure to maximize payoffs in the lab? A test of the inequality aversion hypothesis

In experiments based on the Beard and Beil (1994) game, second movers very often fail to select the decision that maximizes both players payoff. This note reports on a new experimental treatment, in which we neutralize the potential effect of inequality aversion on the likelihood of this behavior. We show this behavior is robust to this change, even after allowing for repetition-based learning.

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File URL: ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2011/11036.pdf
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Paper provided by Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne in its series Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne with number 11036.

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Length: 10 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mse:cesdoc:11036
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  26. Eileen Chou & Margaret McConnell & Rosemarie Nagel & Charles Plott, 2009. "The control of game form recognition in experiments: understanding dominant strategy failures in a simple two person “guessing” game," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 159-179, June.
  27. Willinger, Marc & Keser, Claudia & Lohmann, Christopher & Usunier, Jean-Claude, 2003. "A comparison of trust and reciprocity between France and Germany: Experimental investigation based on the investment game," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 447-466, August.
  28. Nicolas Jacquemet & Robert-Vincent Joule & Stephane Luchini & Jason Shogren, 2013. "Preference Elicitation under Oath," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-00731244, HAL.
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