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Efficiency, equality, positionality: what do people maximize? Experimental vs. hypothetical evidence from Tunisia

Author

Listed:
  • Sana El Harbi

    (USO - جامعة سوسة = Université de Sousse = University of Sousse)

  • Insaf Bekir

    (USO - جامعة سوسة = Université de Sousse = University of Sousse)

  • Gilles Grolleau

    (LAMETA - Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - UM1 - Université Montpellier 1 - UPVM - Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - Montpellier SupAgro - Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier, Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier, BSB - Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Dijon Bourgogne (ESC))

  • Angela Sutan

    (BSB - Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Dijon Bourgogne (ESC))

Abstract

We experimentally test in a developing country whether people prefer a situation where individual and social interests coincide, a situation promoting equality or another one promoting a better relative position. We also investigate whether incentive compatible choices are consistent with results obtained by hypothetical surveys and whether results remain robust when higher stakes are considered. Our results show when stakes are low, a similar proportion of individuals (about 40%) choose the option that maximizes self-interest and social good and the option that promotes equality. Our findings suggest that hypothetical surveys may lead individuals to overestimate positional concerns and to be insensitive to stakes. In presence of higher stakes, egalitarian concerns prevail in incentive compatible experiments.

Suggested Citation

  • Sana El Harbi & Insaf Bekir & Gilles Grolleau & Angela Sutan, 2015. "Efficiency, equality, positionality: what do people maximize? Experimental vs. hypothetical evidence from Tunisia," Post-Print hal-01506386, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01506386
    DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2015.01.007
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    Cited by:

    1. Long Huang & Wansheng Lei & Fuming Xu & Hairong Liu & Liang Yu & Fujun Shi & Lei Wang, 2020. "Maxims nudge equitable or efficient choices in a Trade-Off Game," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(6), pages 1-13, June.
    2. Pellegrin, Claire & Grolleau, Gilles & Mzoughi, Naoufel & Napoleone, Claude, 2018. "Does the Identifiable Victim Effect Matter for Plants? Results From a Quasi-experimental Survey of French Farmers," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 106-113.
    3. Grolleau, Gilles & Meunier, Luc & Mzoughi, Naoufel, 2023. "Polluting for (higher) profits: Does an economic gain influence moral judgment of environmental wrongdoings?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
    4. Colin F. Camerer & Gideon Nave & Alec Smith, 2019. "Dynamic Unstructured Bargaining with Private Information: Theory, Experiment, and Outcome Prediction via Machine Learning," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(4), pages 1867-1890, April.
    5. Clot, Sophie & Grolleau, Gilles & Ibanez, Lisette, 2018. "Shall we pay all? An experimental test of Random Incentivized Systems," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 93-98.
    6. Larney, Andrea & Rotella, Amanda & Barclay, Pat, 2019. "Stake size effects in ultimatum game and dictator game offers: A meta-analysis," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 61-72.
    7. Terence C. Burnham, 2016. "Economics and evolutionary mismatch: humans in novel settings do not maximize," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 195-209, October.
    8. Barbara, Latifa & Grolleau, Gilles & Houfaf Khoufaf, Assia & Meriane, Youcef & Mzoughi, Naoufel, 2018. "Positional concerns and framing effects in financial preferences," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 183-189.
    9. Jérémy Celse, 2018. "Do You Enjoy Having More Than Others or More Than Another? Exploring the Relationship Between Relative Concerns and the Size of the Reference Group," Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement, Springer, vol. 138(3), pages 1089-1118, August.
    10. Gilles Grolleau & Murat C Mungan & Naoufel Mzoughi, 2025. "Perceptions of Justice: Assessing the Perceived Effectiveness of Punishments by Artificial Intelligence versus Human Judges," Post-Print hal-04854067, HAL.
    11. Aemiro Melkamu Daniel & Job van Exel & Caspar G. Chorus, 2024. "Self-interest, positional concerns and distributional considerations in healthcare preferences," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 25(3), pages 423-446, April.
    12. Adam Ayaita & Kerstin Pull, 2022. "Positional preferences and narcissism: evidence from ‘money burning’ dictator games," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 29(3), pages 267-271, February.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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